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The issue of uncertainty is critical for climate change science and policy. A great deal of 
research analysis has gone into identifying the scope and character of uncertainty in climate 
change itself, in how analysts and assessment teams can and should communicate that 
uncertainty to policy- and decision-makers, and how policy- and decision-makers can then 
incorporate knowledge about the sources and magnitude of uncertainty in their choices. The 
primary purpose of this deliverable is to summarize that literature, and to synthesize it in a 
manner that is useful for the Mediation project, namely in improving the practice of assessing 
adaptation needs and options, and in building a useful decision-support platform or system. 
The report starts with a user-driven focus, summarizing the literatures on both descriptive and 
normative models of decision-making under uncertainty, in order to identify the most effective 
and essential information inputs for each of these models. The report then summarizes some 
of the main guidance documents on communicating uncertainty, prepared for or in use by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the United States government, and the Dutch 
government. Finally, the report synthesizes these previous studies for use in the Mediation 
project and its users by focusing on three essential characteristics of uncertainty 
communication: parsimony, personalization, and practicality. It identifies specific strategies for 
using these three criteria to ensure that assessments for climate adaptation are salient, 





Climate change will almost certainly bring a range of impacts on society at the local to 
regional scales. To some, sea level rise is the most important of these, as it threatens to put 
many areas of dense human settlement underwater, or to overwhelm the coastal protection 
systems already in place in many low lying areas. To others, a reduction in soil moisture 
caused by rising temperatures, and in many places augmented by decreasing precipitation, is 
the primary concern, as it threatens to reduce crop yields dramatically, worsening farmers’ 
economic conditions, and in some areas of the world contributing to food insecurity. To 
others, the threat they most worry about is a shift in seasonal precipitation patterns, such as 
from snow to rain during winter months. This will disrupt the source of spring and summer 
runoff that are necessary for crop irrigation and power generation, and will require a redesign 
of water management infrastructure and practices. There are those who worry about the 
spread of tropical disease vectors, the loss or permafrost, the increased frequency of heat 
waves, and the increased occurrence of extreme events. All of these threaten human 
settlements and economic activity, either directly, or through their effects on the provision of 
ecosystem services. 
Adaptation is the practice of coping with the changes in order to minimize their negative 
consequences, and where possible to take advantage of new opportunities. To some extent 
adaptation can occur contemporaneously with the observed changes. Farmers, for example, 
decide what to plant every year, and can change their practices as they observe growing 
conditions changing. But often adaptation can be more effective and less expensive when it 
includes an anticipatory component. Farmers may choose what to plant, but their options are 
constrained by the research and development of seed companies, which produces new 
varieties over decades. Flood barriers can be increased in size after a storm surge that was too 
large, but it makes sense to build them high enough to withstand those in the coming decades. 
A core challenge facing adaptation decisions is preparing for a future that is uncertain and 
risky. Of course this is a challenge that is not new. Bernstein (1996), in his popular historical 
account of risk analysis and management, describes methods going back to ancient Greece. 
What is somewhat new is that climate change adaptation is an area where a huge body of 
scientific research can play a role in guiding decisions.  
1.1 Scientific and social sources of uncertainty 
Uncertainty can take on different characteristics. Consider one example. Air pollution 
legislation in both Europe and North America often requires a determination of what 
constitutes a “safe” level of particular pollutants in the atmosphere, as a target for regulation. 
To establish this, scientists engage in the analysis of how the human body, and in some cases 
ecosystems, respond to varying ambient concentrations of particular chemicals, such as 
ozone. They can then develop dose-response curves describing how the likelihood and 
magnitude of particular negative outcomes, such as cancer in humans, responds in response to 
concentration. Policy makers can then set ambient air quality targets according to these 
curves, in order to keep either likelihood or magnitude below some particular threshold. The 
scientific assessment that informs policy makers is characterized by risk (e.g. a dose response 
curve expressing the likelihood of a given individual contracting an illness for a given 
exposure), but often not by high levels of uncertainty about that risk. The reason for the 
relative absence of uncertainty is that it is possible to base the scientific assessment on large 
datasets, and on experimental methods. 
The science of future climate change is different, because it is not directly based either on 
observational data or experimental methods. Rather, prospective impact studies need to rely 
on models, and while the theory underlying such models is based on observational data, the 
models project a system outside the ranges of climate within which those data were collected. 
As such, the models gluing a lot of uncertainties together without the opportunity to reduce 
them through observation. Dessai and van der Sluijs (2007) describe how climate impact 
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studies, which are prospective in nature, can suffer from an “explosion” of uncertainty, 
resulting from the need to calculate a cascade of events. For example, there are uncertainties 
about how much CO2 emissions will rise or fall over time, the effects that these will have on 
atmospheric concentrations, the sensitivity of global temperature to changes in 
concentrations, and the effects of changing temperature at a global scale on hydro-
meteorological events at the local to regional scales. There are uncertainties associated with 
the impacts of such events on human and ecological systems, either in isolation or in 
combination with other changes. Finally, there are uncertainties about how some people will 
react to these impacts, which often constitute the baseline conditions for others to adapt. 
1.2 Approaches to forecasting- and scenario-based analyses 
For some types of events in the uncertainty chain, it is possible to express the range of 
possible outcomes quantitatively, while for others it is not. Walker et al. (2003) describe this 
as a continuum from a deterministic system to one for which there is total ignorance, shown 
in Figure 1. The example of analysis for air pollution regulation demonstrated a case of 
statistical uncertainty. In the case of climate change, statistical uncertainty exists with respect 
to existing climate data, which have some degree of sampling error that can be expressed in 
terms of particular parameters. Scenario uncertainty lies in our lack of knowledge about 
future human actions, such as the implementation of policies to control emissions. There will 
be some level of emissions, but we do not know what, and the best we can do is to describe 
plausible scenarios of how such futures might develop, and conduct analysis based on each 
plausible story. Recognized ignorance occurs when we know that we do not completely 
understand how something works, and competing models are available. This governs many 
natural processes relevant for climate change adaptation, such as a poor understanding of 
cloud formation. We can conduct alternative analyses, based on the competing models of the 
physical system. All three types of uncertainty contain more information than indeterminacy, 
the point at which we can say nothing about the future. A future that is indeterminate is one 
dominated by total ignorance. In this world, we do not even know what we do not know. 
 
Figure 1: Progress from knowledge to ignorance. Source: Walker et al. (2003) 
Forecasting the future requires the use of models, and modelers have developed a number of 
methods to deal with each of the types of uncertainties described above. Consider the case of 
a single general circulation climate model of the climate, or GCM. Because there is statistical 
uncertainty about past climate data, modelers will run the model many times, sampling from 
the distribution of likely past data, to produce a frequency distribution of future impacts. But 
they will need to do so for a given scenario of the future anthropogenic drivers of climate 
change. For the last decade, the most commonly used scenarios were a set that the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) developed in the Special Report on 
Emissions Scenarios, or SRES (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000). Currently, the IPCC is 
engaged in a process of replacing these scenarios with new ones, known as representative 
concentration pathways (RCPs), which are yet to be associated with particular socio-
economic storylines (Moss et al., 2010). So the GCM team will run an ensemble of model 
runs—running the model several times while varying the starting conditions within the range 
of uncertainty of past data—for each of a number of scenarios. Finally, different models 
represent systems for which there is recognized ignorance in different ways. Thus, the IPCC 
will draw off of ensemble runs for different scenarios using different models. These will 
generate the full range of outcomes that people expect, given that (a) the diversity of 
scenarios captures the range of what people might do in the future, and (b) the models 
captures the range of plausible explanations of how systems function. There are sometimes 
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reasons to expect one or both of these conditions to be violated (Rahmstorf et al., 2007); 
people might surprise us, and either emit far more of far less than the current range of 
scenarios, and the climate system might surprise us, behaving far differently in its new 
operating range than it has in the past. 
1.3 The purpose of this deliverable 
Describing uncertainty, either qualitatively or quantitatively, presents a major challenge to 
environmental modeling and assessment. Making decisions in cases where uncertainty is a 
defining feature of the problem likewise presents a major challenge to policy-makers and 
decision-makers. In between these two tasks lies the area of communication: characterizing 
uncertainty as scientists have described it in such a way as to assist decision-makers use the 
information in productive and consistent ways (Risbey and Kandlikar, 2007).  
Decision support is the process of incorporating the results from scientific research and 
assessment into a package of information or set of tools that can be useful for particular 
people, working in particular contexts, on particular problems (Cash et al., 2003). Research 
has shown quite clearly that the development of user-oriented decision-support systems can 
greatly increase the use of scientific information by such people (Clark et al., 2007; Guston, 
2001). In particular, research has demonstrated with actual field studies that well designed 
decision-support systems are instrumental in the very decision to use of climate information 
containing uncertainty (Cash et al., 2006; Patt et al., 2007; Patt et al., 2005).  
The purpose of the MEDIATION project at its most ambitious is to develop a decision 
support system, or integrated platform, to assist adaptation decision makers in Europe through 
the design and development of a climate change clearinghouse of information. A more 
modest objective of the project is to improve on methods for assessing adaptation needs and 
options. This paper constitutes a contractual deliverable for that project, on the issue of 
uncertainty. Hence, the particular question that this paper addresses is how an adaptation 
decision-support system for Europe, or for adaptation decision-making in general, can and 
should address the issue of uncertainty. Importantly, our aim is not to suggest methods for 
modeling uncertainty that are at the scientific forefront in terms of integrated assessment 
modeling. Rather, our aim is to suggest how the uncertainty inherent in model outputs ought 
best to be represented, in order to be most useful to decision-makers.  
Not only did other MEDIATION experts, notably Jochen Hinkel and Rob Swart, contribute to 
the deliverable 4.1, which was written primarily by Anthony Patt from IIASA, the deliverable 
also played a role in communications about the subject of dealing with uncertainties with the 
CLIMSAVE project and the CIRCLE workshop on uncertainties and climate change 
adaptation in November 2010 that was co-organized by MEDIATION coordinator Rob Swart 
and in which Anthony Patt played a pertinent role. Follow-up activities are currently planned 
now in the context of the development of a European Guidance on Uncertainty Management 
and Communication with several partners from the CIRCLE network. So, the deliverable was 
certainly a wider team effort with several connections even outside MEDIATION even if we 
only listed the main author on the cover. 
While we hope that this paper may be useful for a number of readers outside the project as a 
practical guide for framing uncertainty in the process of scientific assessment and decision-
support to inform adaptation, the primary purpose is to inform researchers inside the project, 
who are in the process of developing particular packages of information and decision-making 
tools. 
2 Models of individual decision-making under uncertainty 
A starting point for considering the treatment of uncertainty in decision-support is a 
consideration of how people make decisions in the first place, and how those methods may or 
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may not be sensitive to uncertainty. Loosely speaking, one can divide decision science into 
two areas of research. The first, which we cover in this section, consists of a set of descriptive 
models, describing how individual people and groups of people can and do make decisions. 
The second, which we cover in the next section, consists of a set of normative and 
prescriptive models, describing how people and groups of people should make decisions in 
order to achieve outcomes that they themselves would view as successful.  
2.1 Economic models 
In arguing for more effective communication of uncertainty in the area of climate change, 
Webster (2003) proposed:  
Uncertainty is not important merely for computing an expected value or ‘best 
guess’. In fact, information on variability and on low-probability high-consequence 
events allows decision makers to account for society’s risk-aversion in their 
choices. Furthermore, today’s decision is not made once now, but will be 
continually revised in the future as our understanding evolves. The optimal 
decision today depends not only on current uncertainty, but our expectation of how 
it will change and how we will respond in the future. This adaptive decision 
process will be aided by carefully tracking how uncertainties change with new 
knowledge. Thus, carefully assessing the risks of future climate change impacts is a 
critical task as a component of scientific support for decision makers. 
While this statement appears to simply reflect common sense, in fact it makes a number of 
assumptions about how people make decisions, all of which can be described as economic 
assumptions: people make optimal decisions, based on the information at hand; they change 
those decisions when new information suggests them to be sub-optimal; they are risk averse. 
The theory that captures all of these elements is expected utility theory (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944). According to this model, decision-makers derive utility from different 
patterns of consumption, and those patterns depend on the outcomes of their choices. 
Uncertainty implies that that each choice can lead to a range, or distribution, of future 
outcomes. Decision-makers decide among the choice options by selecting the option that will 
provide the greatest expected utility associated with its distribution of outcomes, i.e. a 
weighted average of utility with the probabilities associated with each potential outcome 
acting as weights. To calculate the expected value associated with each choice option, they 
need to integrate the utility function across the distribution of potential outcomes, and this 
means that they need to know, or make assumptions about, that distribution. It is commonly 
assumed that people are risk averse, which implies that the relationship between consumption 
and utility is not linear; if people gain decreasing marginal utility from increasing 
consumption, then the expected utility associated with a range of uncertain outcomes will be 
less than the single level of utility associated with the expected, or average outcome.  
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Figure 2—Utility and risk aversion. The curve shows the relationship between 
consumption and utility for a person who is risk averse. Consumption levels A and 
B are the potential outcomes of a lottery, while U(A) and U(B) are the 
corresponding utility levels. If the outcomes A and B are each equally likely, then 
U(D) is the expected utility from the lottery, the average of U(A) and U(B). The 
consumption level D is the amount of money that, if obtained with certainty, would 
provide the same expected utility of the lottery. Because of the concave shape of 
the curve, D lies to the left of C, the expected outcome of the lottery. The person 
would be willing to trade the lottery for a certain outcome of at least D. This is 
what insurance contracts provide, and there will be a market for insurance if the 
space between C and D is large enough to cover the transaction costs of the 
insurance.   
Figure 2 shows an example of this. Since everybody knows—consciously or 
subconsciously—only their own utility function and their own degree of risk aversion, they 
need to calculate for themselves (again, either consciously or subconsciously) the utility 
associated with each possible outcome, and from that a level of expected utility. If these 
calculations guide choices, such as whether to engage in a risky activity or to purchase 
insurance, then it is essential only to provide them with estimates of the probability of 
different outcomes, and to let them make their own decisions with this information, based on 
an analysis of expected utility.  
A growing number of economists have taken note of the fact that people often make decisions 
that are apparently inconsistent, such as simultaneously buying insurance (risk averse 
behavior) and playing the lottery (risk loving behavior). Continuing to assume that people are 
trying to optimize their utility, two alternative explanations are that they get their math wrong 
working with probabilities, or that they have multiple utility functions. The field of behavioral 
economics straddles the line between economics and psychology, in that it uses both models 
and research methods associated with the field of psychology to examine both faulty math 
and multiple utility functions, while remaining true to economics in terms of still assuming 
some objective function (or set of objective functions) to be maximized. 
Along the former line, behavioral economists have shown that people are often biased in the 
probability estimates, due to context-specific perceptions and mental shortcuts that they use 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Where people are given 
precise probabilities of relatively abstract events occurring (e.g. the probabilities of winning 
different sums of money in a lottery), most people appear to over-react to especially small 
probabilities (close to 0), and under-react to especially large ones (close to 1) (Allais and 
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Hagen, 1979; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Similarly, where there are two potential 
outcomes, the probability of each occurring are adjusted within most people’s minds towards 
0.5 (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2000). In less abstract settings, most people’s estimates are 
heavily influenced by a set of factors closely associated with the emotional impact of the 
event itself. Events that are more easily remembered are viewed as more likely than those that 
are not (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973), and events that generate strong emotional reactions 
of dread or a loss of control (e.g. a shark attack, a plane crash), not coincidentally because 
they are then more easily remembered, are also seen as more likely (Covello, 1990). Indeed, 
even when people are told the probabilities of different events occurring, most of them 
remember those probabilities differently depending on their emotional reaction to the events 
and how plausible those probabilities seem (Windschitl and Weber, 1999). Finally, there is 
the observation that people are uncertainty, or ambiguity, averse. The so-called Ellsberg 
paradox showed that people prefer to take a risk in which the probabilities of winning are 
known, compared to one in which they are not, a case of so-called Knightian uncertainty, 
even when the expected outcome of the gambles were the same (Chow and Sarin, 2001). 
The challenge for communicators, given these observed biases, is to provide information that 
helps people compare the probabilities of different events, to avoid using emotion-laden 
language that will trigger particular biases, and to help people use the information to calculate 
optimal, or at least good, strategies. The field of risk communication developed out of these 
efforts, and is based on the idea that the best way to assist decision-makers coping with risk 
and uncertainty is to give them information in such a way as to correct their mistaken beliefs 
(Leiss, 1996). In order to do so, the communicator needs to understand how the decision-
maker is using information to form beliefs, and become a partner with the decision-maker in 
working with the new information to arrive at actual decisions (Fischhoff, 1995). 
Along the latter line, economists have shown that the utility people anticipate receiving from 
the outcomes of choices depends on context-specific issues of perception: the perceived 
departure of outcomes from the status quo (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Munroe and 
Sugden, 2003; Patt and Zeckhauser, 2000; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988); the agents 
perceived to be causing those changes (Ritov and Baron, 1992); the perceived fairness of the 
outcomes (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Kahneman et al., 1986; Knetch, 1997); and a long list of 
other factors. Often, there are consistent and predictable differences between the utility that 
people anticipate receiving from particular outcomes before they make a decision, and that 
which they do in fact experience once those outcomes actually occur. Framing is the 
inevitable act of describing a decision and the relevant background information to make it 
understandable and interesting to decision-makers (Kühberger, 1998). There are often many 
frames that are logically equivalent, but which can trigger different sets of values. For 
example, most people show different preferences for risk when decisions are framed as 
affecting either their gains relative to the status quo, or their losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979). The challenge for communicators is to be aware that they may be triggering 
counterproductive values when they frame uncertainty in particular ways. Either, they need to 
work with people to make sure that the people understand how their values may be 
influenced, at least temporarily, by the new information, so that they can then make decisions 
based on their “real” utility function, or the experts (who are presumably not influenced by 
emotions) need to figure out what the best decision is, and make it for them (Breyer, 1993; 
Zeckhauser and Viscusi, 1996). 
2.2 Psychological models 
Many prominent behavioral economists had their training in psychology, and there is 
substantial overlap between the psychological literature and the behavioral economics 
literature in the area of developing confidence judgments and estimating likelihoods. The 
point of departure is what people’s motivations while making decisions are, and hence how 
their beliefs actually influence their choices. The psychological models of people’s 
motivations are too numerous to discuss in detail here, but they share a common feature in 
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that, unlike economic models, they do not assume that individuals make decisions in order to 
maximize the utility derived from consumption. 
Bounded rationality, for example, suggests that people engage in a mental search of available 
options, and choose the first one that is satisfactory (Simon, 1956). This so-called satisficing 
is different from optimizing in that it involves comparing not the outcomes of different choice 
options, but of each choice option with a set of minimum criteria. Closely linked to bounded 
rationality is the concept of adaptive heuristics: people develop and use mental shortcuts to 
identify acceptable options quickly, with a minimal amount of necessary information (Payne 
et al., 1993). One of the clearest examples is of a person trying to catch a ball hit into the sky, 
such as in a baseball game. A model based on optimization would have the person calculate 
where the ball will land, based on an estimation of the speed and direction at which the ball 
was hit, factoring in the effects of gravity and air resistance. To optimize the chances of 
catching ball, the person will run to that place as quickly as possible. Actual ball players, 
however, apparently doesn’t have time for such calculations, and instead rely on the “fast and 
frugal” gaze heuristic: they keep their eye on the ball and observe the angle at which it 
appears above the horizon. When that angle appears to be decreasing, they accelerate towards 
the ball; when the angle is increasing, they accelerate away from the ball. If they can 
accelerate quickly enough, their path will always intercept that of the ball before it hits the 
ground, without their ever knowing where that point of interception will be (which is why 
they sometimes crash into walls while running) (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001). People 
continually develop and improve upon such heuristics as they gain familiarity with a decision-
domain; they use and refine the techniques that work.  
Information can change people’s beliefs and judgments of confidence, but as a result of not 
only the content of the information, but also its source (Weber et al., 2000). Most people 
weight information gained from personal experience quite differently than they do 
information gained from third parties, and the form of the personal experience can also make 
a difference (Edgell et al., 2004; Griffin and Tversky, 1992). People are more likely to trust 
expert opinion when they fully understand it, and when they perceive it coming from a source 
with an obligation to be honest, such as arising out of a previous social relationship 
(Birnbaum and Mellers, 1983; Birnbaum and Stegner, 1979; Birnbaum et al., 1976; Darr and 
Kurtzberg, 2000; Patt et al., 2006; Sniezek et al., 2004). Indeed, many people modify their 
choices in response to new information not necessarily because they believe the information 
itself to be true, but rather in order to signal that they have accepted the help that was offered 
by the information provider (Harvey and Fischer, 1997).  
Perhaps most importantly, information can affect not only beliefs, but also the motivation to 
act on the basis of those beliefs. For example, information that ought to be most valuable 
from the perspective of belief updating—that which is quite different from their prior 
beliefs—often has little effect on people’s actions, either because they reject it out of hand in 
order to preserve their own self-confidence (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986), or because accepting 
it reduces their self-confidence and motivation to take any action at all (Prentice-Dunn and 
Rogers, 1986). By contrast, offering people information that confirms their prior beliefs can 
provide additional motivation to act. There are many models that take this into account, but 
one such is known as protection motivation theory, used by Grothmann and Patt (2005) to 
study adaptation. Figure 3 shows the model they applied to analyze the data. Their results 
indicated that the socio-psychological variables had a stronger influence on decision outcome 
that the socio-economic ones. 
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Figure 3: Process model of adaptation to climate change based on protection 
motivation theory. Source: by Grothmann and Patt (2005) 
If people are not optimizing expected utility, then helping them to understand the precise 
probabilities associated with different possible outcomes of decisions is not necessarily a 
productive exercise. Rather, it is important for communicators to help them explore the 
consequences of their own actions on different future scenarios, and to see which decisions 
make them happiest given how their actions will change their future. Some types of 
information can lead them to withdraw from a decision, while other types of information can 
lead them to engage. Too much information may be counter-productive. The information that 
is most relevant is that to which they can relate at an emotional level. To do that, it is essential 
to identify the “mental models” that people have of the physical or social systems giving rise 
to uncertainty, and to relate communication efforts precisely to those models (Morgan et al., 
2001; Morgan and Henrion, 1990).  
2.3 Social and political models 
While both economic and psychological theories of decision-making explain people’s actions 
in social settings, their focus is still on the individual. A separate set of models, which one can 
loosely label social (although they are rooted in a number of disciplines, including sociology, 
anthropology, and geography), centers of the social context for decision-making and action. 
Historically, scholars in these fields have reached very different conclusions from economists 
and risk communicators about the role of scientific information in decision-making processes. 
The role that scientific information plays in decision-making depends critically on the social 
processes through which that information is transmitted and processed (Jasanoff et al., 2002), 
and  Kasperson and Kasperson (1996) show how particular social institutions can amplify or 
attenuate the perception of risk. Proponents of the cultural theory of risk, for example, suggest 
that there are several distinct worldviews, or discourses, and that people interpret information 
in ways that are consistent with their own view (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Thompson et 
al., 1990). The same piece of information about a particular risk may to a heirarchist suggest 
great need for control, to an egalitarian greater need for caution, to an individualist greater 
need for individual autonomy, and to a fatalist greater cause for resignation. People can 
continue to believe that they are ignorant of a particular subject, even after having received a 
great deal of information about it, in order to maintain their social identity (Michael, 1996). 
People see their own type of knowledge as tied to their social identity, and often cannot 
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communicate effectively with scientists, whose social identity is quite different (Wynne, 
1996). The fault need not lie with the lay decision-makers, but with the scientists who assume 
that their own interpretation of evidence is more reliable.  
Scientific uncertainty influences decision-making by altering political discourse. Policy-
makers rely on scientific evidence to add legitimacy to their actions (Ezrahi, 1990). When the 
scientific community admits that it does not know the answer to policy relevant questions, it 
may bolster the credibility of scientists themselves (Shackley and Wynne, 1996), but at the 
same time it undercuts the legitimizing function that they provide, and becomes a publicly 
accepted justification for postponing action (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990; Funtowicz and 
Ravetz, 1993). It is not surprising, then, that groups interested in maintaining the status quo in 
the climate change policy arena do not simply deny the problem exists, but rather claim that 
the science is too uncertain to base any actions upon (Gelbspan, 1997). Conflict about issues 
of science does not necessarily have the same sedative effect (Dryzek, 1997; Lee, 1993). In 
highly contested issue areas, experts commonly line up on both sides of the political fence, 
each group playing a legitimizing role, with the media then highlighting these differences of 
scientific opinion (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004). Conflict-based uncertainty may be a signal to 
the public that a particular issue is important and politically contested, and hence that policy 
actions may be necessary (Patt, 2007). 
The observation that people will not take an action when the motivation for it is uncertain has 
led to the strategy of communicating the most likely outcome as relatively certain, rather than 
reveal uncertainty (Irwin and Wynne, 1996). But when events are uncertain, and scientists do 
not reveal them to be so, there is a chance that the scientists will appear to be wrong. This in 
turn can lead to a major loss of credibility. For example, in the early 1990’s, the government 
of the state of Ceará in Brazil began to warn farmers about upcoming droughts associated 
with El Niño, a pattern of warm water off the coast of South America. Farmers were happy to 
take the government’s advice, and to plant drought tolerant crop varieties when they were 
warned of a bad year. But then one year the government warned of a bad year, and the rains 
turned out to be good. After that, the farmers were unwilling to follow the advice they were 
given (Orlove and Tosteson, 1999). Several years later, exactly the same story repeated itself 
in Zimbabwe (Glantz, 2000). Research has shown that the perception of error can destroy the 
credibility of some fragile mechanisms to generate trust in information, but has less of an 
effect when the decision-maker has good reason to believe that the communicator is being 
honest (Patt et al., 2006). 
2.4 Insights on individuals acting in an agency capacity 
An interesting characteristic of different approaches to descriptive decision-theory is that they 
are built on very different methods. The neo-classical approach begins with a few 
fundamental axioms of human behavior, formalizes them into a system of inequalities and 
equations, and then build on them using calculus and other mathematical tools, to build a 
richer description of behavior consistent with the axioms. Behavioral economics builds 
primarily on experimental methods, the results of which are often analyzed while assuming a 
subset of the economic axioms are correct. The experiments to support behavioral economics 
have traditionally taken place in the laboratory, using paid subjects; a recent trend towards 
field experiments involves setting up controlled variance in actual decision-makers 
conditions, and observing the results. For example, results reported in Patt et al. (2005), 
suggesting that farmers are much more likely to use information when presented 
probabilistically in a workshop setting than deterministically over the radio, relied on a 
method by which subsistence farmers in Zimbabwe were randomly assigned to two groups, 
each receiving the same information through different channels. Supporting behavioral 
economics are also econometric analyses of large databases, such as of consumer spending 
habits (e.g., Laibson et al., 2004). Psychological decision-making research relies to a large 
extent on methods similar to behavioral economics (e.g., Grothmann and Patt, 2005; e.g., 
Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006), supplemented more recently with neuro-science methods 
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such as functional MRI imagining.  
Research into the social and political aspects of decision-making, by contrast, rely almost 
exclusively on qualitative methods, such as open ended interviews, focus groups, and 
workshops. In this case, people are often interviewed about how they have made decisions 
within the context of their specific role in a firm, organization, or political process. They 
suggest the factors that matter most for their decisions. 
An important question, however, is whether people operating in a formal capacity, i.e., as an 
agent in an organization, act in ways that deviate strongly from the economic one. The reason 
it is so difficult is that it is almost always possible to come up with an ex post explanation for 
a given decision that is consistent with the economic model, simply by focusing on particular 
well-grounded subjective beliefs going into the decision. This is what educated people, who 
know that they are supposed to be rationale when “on the job,” usually do when being 
interviewed. The way around this—conducting field experiments—is usually impractical. Patt 
et al. (2005) were able to conduct a field experiment with farmers in Zimbabwe, simply 
because farmers in Zimbabwe have access to very little information, and for very little 
remuneration were willing to participate in an experiment. Doing similar work with 
conscientious flood planners in the Netherlands would be impossible. 
What one can surmise, however, is that acting in a professional capacity can influence 
judgment, by forcing individuals to focus on particular problems. A comparison of policy-
makers and ordinary citizens’ perceptions of climate risks, for example, revealed the policy-
makers to perceive the seriousness of climate change higher compared to other major risks in 
society, such as crime and disease (Patt and Schröter, 2008). One can also surmise that where 
organizations have established formal procedures for making optimal decisions, individuals in 
the organization will tend to follow these to some extent, and the deviation from optimality 
given ex ante knowledge will be reduced. Importantly, they may not be eliminated, simply 
because people may turn a “blind eye” to information that runs counter to their decision that 
they prefer, based on their gut feeling. 
3 Formal decision-analysis frameworks 
In the previous section we offered a set of descriptive models of how people make decisions, 
with some general implications for the presentation of uncertainty. Perhaps the strongest 
conclusion to draw is that as soon as people step out of the economic model, which they often 
appear to do, the communication of uncertainty needs to become more nuanced. This is 
because the communication of some kinds of uncertainty can easily lead people towards 
inaction. In an economic model, inaction is simply another form of action, namely a decision 
to remain with the status quo. In psychological and political models, inaction is often a 
decision not to decide.  
In this section, by contrast, we offer a set of normative or prescriptive decision-making 
models, suggestions of how people and organizations ought to go through the process of 
choosing. By definition these have been designed to arrive at the best possible decision, they 
are consistent with the economic model in descriptive decision theory, which rests on the 
assumption that people engage in a process of finding the best possible decision. 
Dessai and van der Sluijs (2007), building on Toth (2000), suggested dividing decision-
making frameworks into two dimensions. The first is a set of normative principles about what 
factors matter for the best possible decision, while the second is a set of methods used to 
analyze available information to achieve the stated principles. In Figure 4, they matched up 




Figure 4: Decision principles and analytic frameworks. The * indicates that the 
given principle forms an essential feature of the analytic framework, the + that it is 
a possible but not essential feature, and the – that it does not play a role. Source: 
Dessai and van der Sluijs (2007) after Toth (2000) 
We will characterize things slightly differently in this section. First, we divide analytic 
approaches into two general categories. The first is a set of approaches towards choosing 
between multiple options to arrive at the best one. All of these optimizing approaches require 
the person engaged in the process to assign values to outcomes, but it turns out that there are a 
number of approaches for assigning values, which is our second category of approaches. 
Decision principles, we believe, can more usefully be represented as alternative parameters to 
be used in the valuation process. Indeed it is in the valuation methods used that the treatment 
of uncertainty is especially important. For this reason we will focus primarily on this latter 
category of methods. 
3.1 Methods of choice selection  
There are a number of formal methods for choosing the best option from a number of 
alternatives. Work Package 3 of the MEDIATION project covers these in far greater detail, 
and so we will only skim them here, paying closer attention to how they handle uncertainty.   
It is important to note that all of the methods we describe here are formal methods for 
identifying the best choice. There are, of course, less formal methods. At the individual level 
this is often by gut feeling, a process the psychological models seek to describe. At the 
organization level it is often based on structured debate and voting, in which a number of 
individuals, each deciding according to gut feeling, participate. There are thousands of 
different processes for this, and the social and political models seek to capture some of the 
key elements of these. Importantly, the results from formal decision analysis are most 
frequently used as inputs into informal processes. 
One can argue that economic models offer a normatively correct model for making decisions, 
even if they do not accurately describe how people actually operate. One might suspect that 
well intentioned individuals, given enough time to consider all available information, and 
aware of the biases potentially inherent in psychology and politics, would adopt an economic 
approach. But this view is not universal. Gigerenzer (2000), for example, suggests that the 
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heuristics associated with bounded rationality actually improve decision-making over what 
economic models can offer, given real constraints in information and processing ability. Not 
only does our subconscious mind often arrive at intuitive judgments quickly, informing these 
judgments are often observations about subtle environment cues—things like the body 
language of others around us—that we are not even consciously aware of. Supporting this 
view, a well-known story concerns a particular professor of economic decision-theory, who 
was faced with an especially life altering choice. His student asked him how he intended to 
make the decision, expecting him to say that he had assigned a value to all of the possible 
outcomes, considered the likelihoods of each, and calculated the expected utility associated 
with the two possible choices. The professor surprised him: “Normally I would do that, but 
this decision is important, so I need to follow my gut instinct.” 
Whether or not any of these less formal methods produces good outcomes, or interprets the 
results of the formal methods wisely, is a matter of debate. For example, there are research 
results to suggest that people derive substantial psychological benefit from being able to 
participate in decision-making processes, rather than having decisions made for them (Frey, 
1994; Frey and Stutzer, 2000). In this case, a democratic method may produce better 
outcomes than a formal method applied by experts, if any superiority in outcome from the 
formal method does not outweigh the psychological effect of participation. 
3.1.1 Multi-criteria analysis 
Multi criteria analysis (MCA) is the process of choosing the best option by comparing the 
different options on a number of criteria. There are two subjective steps, and one 
computational step. First, decision-makers identify and weight the criteria to be used. Second, 
they identify the options and appraise them according to the separate criteria. Combining the 
appraisals on the separate criteria with the weighting for the different criteria yields a score 
for each option. The decision-maker chooses the option with the highest score. Figure 5 
shows a typical matrix for such a choice problem, involving a choice between three cars to 
purchase. 
 
Figure 5: An example of a multi-criteria analysis. The decision maker selects the 
relative weights for the separate criteria, and then the relative scores for the options 
on each criterion. In this example, Car 1 would be the best choice, with the highest 
final score, which represents the weighted average of the three criteria scores for 
each option. 
The challenging part of MCA is in setting the algorithm for establishing criteria weights on 
the one-hand, and evaluating the options on each criterion on the other. A number of methods 
are available, many embodied in the form of particular software packages. Some of these 
involve making a series of pair-wise comparisons, while others involve evaluating the full set 
together. There are some forms of MCA that have been formally adopted by particular 
organizations and institutions. For example, the analysis of transport projects in the United 
Kingdom takes place using the New Approach to Appraisal, or NATA, framework. The 
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NATA framework standardizes the criteria and their weights. 
MCA can deal with uncertainty in four ways. First, it is most common to conduct MCA 
simply using expected outcomes, or average values, for each uncertain element. Second, it is 
possible to conduct a sensitivity analysis, generating separate MCA results using the end 
points of the ranges of uncertain values. This allows the analyst to observe under what 
conditions different choice outcomes come out as preferable. Third, when there is enough 
information about the uncertain values to construct a probability distribution, it is possible to 
incorporate MCA into a Monte Carlo analysis, drawing the uncertain values from that 
distribution, and then identifying probability bands for which different choice options appear 
optimal. Fourth, it is possible to embed different scenarios into the MCA itself, assigning 
weights to each scenario based both on their expected likelihood of occurring and the 
seriousness associated with each scenario, perhaps based on psychological factors. Consider 
the example in Figure 5. While styling is a completely subjective element and thus involves 
no uncertainty, both cost and safety rely on quantitative estimates, and could be uncertain 
values. Cost, for example, could be the sum of the purchase price and the operation and 
maintenance costs. These latter may follow a well-defined distribution, but it is the high cost 
scenarios that trouble the purchaser the most, since these could bankrupt her. This method 
would generate a single MCA output, namely the identification of the optimal choice option 
given the uncertainty. It is, however, less transparent than the use of sensitivity or Monte 
Carlo analysis.  
3.1.2 Cost-benefit analysis 
Cost benefit analysis (CBA, also known by many environmental economists as benefit cost 
analysis, BCA) is a special case of MCA, whereby all criteria are weighted according to a 
single metric, namely monetary values. Because the assignment of monetary costs can be 
done using market prices, or results from hedonic analyses (to assign costs, for example, to 
life years), CBA is often useful for public decisions where there is not time or money to 
engage in a lengthy process of establishing weights for the different criteria with the relevant 
stakeholders. 
Analysts can apply CBA to decide between a number of discrete options, or to identify the 
optimal level of action along a continuous distribution. In the former, the analyst assigns all 
costs and benefits for all the options, and chooses the one with the highest net benefits. In the 
latter, the analyst derives cost and benefit curves. The optimal location is where the difference 
between benefits and costs is greatest; this is also the place where the marginal costs and 
marginal benefits are the same. Figure 6 shows this.  
 
Figure 6: CBA of options along a continuous distribution, using the example of 
pollution abatement. The left hand graph shows total cost and benefit curves, and 
the optimal level of pollution abatement is at point L*, where the distance between 
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the two curves is the greatest. This is the same position as on the right hand graph, 
where L* is derived from seeing where the marginal cost and benefit curves 
intersect. The left hand graph also indicates, with a horizontal arrow, the range of 
options from Lmin to Lmax, that would pass a cost-benefit test, namely having 
positive net benefits, and preferable to taking no action at all. Analysis using only 
marginal costs and benefits does not reveal this range. 
A number of legislative frameworks require the use of CBA. In the United States, for 
example, all new regulations proposed by executive agencies must be subjected to CBA. In 
the European Union, CBA is required for all legislative proposals from the Commission, 
starting with official strategies (White Papers) and going through to final legislation in the 
form of Directives and Regulations.  
In the area of climate change it is important to distinguish between the use of CBA for setting 
mitigation targets, and its use in adaptation planning. With respect to the former, there are a 
number of integrated assessment models (IAMs) designed to conduct CBA, such as DICE 
(Nordhaus, 1994; Nordhaus, 2008; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000) and FUND (Tol, 2003; Tol, 
2005; Tol, 2008). These evaluate the expected costs (in terms of additional resources devoted 
to the energy system in order to decarbonizes it) and benefits (in terms of reduced damage 
costs from climate impacts) associated with alternative climate mitigation targets. While 
adaptation plays a role in these models, it is to modify the benefits side of the equation, since 
optimizing adaptation—if that is possible—ought to have the effect of reducing climate 
damages, and hence the benefits to be obtained from mitigation. As Patt et al. (2010c) argue, 
these models are not useful for studying adaptation problems themselves, except insofar as 
they may make a difference for what is viewed as the optimal level of mitigation. By contrast 
CBA for the purpose of adaptation planning will typically rely on the use of smaller scale 
models, applicable to a particular place where a given adaptation problem is faced.  
The most common manner in which analysts deal with uncertainty in the application of CBA 
is through the use of expected values, or average values, of total or marginal costs and 
benefits. Another manner, used typically either when the range of uncertainty is great or it is 
impossible to describe a cost or benefit distribution sufficiently clearly to identify an average, 
is to express the net benefits for each option in terms of an uncertainty range. In this case, 
sensitivity analysis can reveal whether the identification of a particular choice option as best 
is sensitive to the uncertainties in costs and benefits. 
To our knowledge there has been a single study of the use of CBA in politically negotiated (as 
opposed to regulatory) decision-making for environmental policy, which revealed that it is not 
a favored method, precisely because uncertainties in the benefits often being perceived as too 
high to make the results appear robust (Patt, 1999). This would be an example of the 
mismatch between the use of expressly economic decision-making framework in a context of 
a decision-making context fitting a socio-political descriptive model. 
3.1.3 Cost-effectiveness analysis 
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is used to identify the least cost way of reaching a fixed 
policy or decision-making target. As such, CEA does not identify the optimal target itself, but 
only the best way of reaching a target that, in and of itself, may or may not make sense from 
an economic perspective. CEA is often attractive, or even mandated, in those cases where the 
setting of targets reflects political concerns (Patt, 1999). A variant on CEA is cost risk 
analysis. In this case, the target that has been selected is the reduction of one particular risk to 
a particular threshold. A long standing example of this is the regulation of air pollution in the 
United States, which be law must be done to a level at which zero risk is present; CEA 
analysis can be used to identify the least-cost strategy most appropriate to eliminate risk. CEA 
can also be used in the flip side: instead of identifying the option with lowest cost to achieve a 
set target, identifying the option that achieves the most given a set budget. In this case, the 
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budget is something that would have been determined elsewhere.  
As with CBA, it is important to distinguish the use of CEA for adaptation and for mitigation. 
In the mitigation context, CEA has become a popular tool used by energy modelers seeking to 
find the least cost way to avoid exceeding 2°C average temperature rise, a target that has 
resulted from political negotiation, taking into account evidence from a great number of 
academic disciplines (Barker, 2008; Edenhofer et al., 2005; Held et al., 2009; Knopf et al., 
2008). In the area of adaptation planning, CEA would typically be used to identify options to 
achieve particular impact thresholds. For example, the Natura 2000 framework for 
biodiversity (European Council, 1992) sets specific targets to be met in habitat conservation; 
adaptation policy will have to achieve these targets in the context of climate change, and CEA 
could be used to do so at minimal cost. These kinds of analysis embody the precautionary 
principle (O'Riordan and Jäger, 1996), in that they set a limit that, in the presence of a great 
deal of uncertainty, is felt to ensure that no catastrophic or irreversible damages will accrue 
(Lempert and Collins, 2007).  
As with CBA, CEA incorporates uncertainty typically by focusing either on expected costs, or 
else on distributions of costs, such as ranges, and then applying sensitivity analysis to 
examine what these mean for the identification of the optimal choice option. 
3.1.4 Robust decision making 
Ten years ago, Lempert and Schlesinger (2000) proposed the approach of robust decision 
making that would specifically take into account many of the deep uncertainties associated 
with climate change. They suggest reframing the question from deciding on the best choice 
option given what is likely to happen in the future to “what actions should we take given that 
cannot predict the future” (Lempert and Schlesinger, 2000, 391). To answer this problem, 
they suggest, one can use computer models to explore a great number of possible future 
scenarios associated with each of the choice options (Lempert, 2002). In this case, one can 
then identify those scenarios under which each of the choice options is on the one hand 
preferable, and on the other hand particularly bad. Even if the level of uncertainty is so high 
that it is impossible to assess the relative likelihoods of the different scenarios, such 
exploratory modeling can allow the decision-maker to choose choice options that avoid 
particularly nasty outcomes. This goes well beyond the traditional use of scenarios because it 
seeks not to base analysis on a limited number of plausible and illustrative scenarios, but on a 
much larger set of scenarios generated to capture the full range of possible futures. It also 
goes beyond sensitivity analysis in the context of CBA, since it recognizes that in complex 
systems there may be non-linear responses, or basins of attraction to irreversible outcomes, 
that examining only the boundaries of a range of uncertainty fails to capture. 
Robust decision-making is the only method that one could characterize as an optimization 
approach that explicitly recognizes the potential inability of science to offer well-defined 
probabilities, combined with the possibility of irreversible outcomes associated with 
particular choice options (Scheffer, 2009). In this respect it is especially well suited to the 
climate mitigation problem. It is less clear whether it is as suited to adaptation problems, 
especially where these do not involve important irreversibilities. Simple sensitivity analysis 
on CBA or CEA, using the range of possible climate impact futures, may be sufficient, and 
substantially less computationally intense. 
3.2 Valuation methods 
The previous section described methods for making decisions and the ways in which can 
handle uncertainty. All of these methods require as inputs particular values associated with 
different outcomes, whether monetary (as in CBA and CEA) or not (as in MCA). In this 
section we present a number of ways to arrive at these values, especially the monetary values 
needed for CBA and CEA. 
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3.2.1 Expected outcome valuation 
The most common way of valuing outcomes for decision analysis is to take the simple 
expected value, EV, where in Equation 1 c(xi) is the cost and pi the probability, associated 
with all n possible outcomes x. 
 EV = c (x i
i= 1
n
∑ )p i. (Equation 1) 
This method, of course, requires knowing the probability density function associated with all 
possible outcomes. Where this is not available from models, the analyst subjectively estimates 
the likelihood of different probabilities, or simply their mean value. Expert elicitation is a 
method to discover opinions that analysts hold about these distributions or their means 
(Risbey et al., 2000). 
3.2.2 General equilibrium analysis 
Not just Buddhists, but also economists, suggest that all things are interconnected. In 
economic theory, every action of individuals to engage in particular forms of consumption 
changes the market clearing price of those and competing goods. Thus when the government 
puts in a place a policy that creates specific winners and loser, it has the effect of changing 
consumption habits, again with ripple effects making their way through the entire economy. 
These ripple effects can generate additional winners and losers, as they increase consumption 
of some goods and reduce consumption of others, with a corresponding reallocation of labor 
and capital.  
For government projects that are small relative to the size of the market, the magnitude of 
these ripple effects are likely to be very small; in such cases, the costs and benefits can be 
measured in terms of the financial gains and costs to the people directly affected. When, 
however, the policy is substantial, the ripple effects can be substantial, and ignoring them 
leads to a very incomplete picture of the full economic consequences of the project. To deal 
with this, neo-classical economists use computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, which 
predict all of the ways in which a single government project changes the equilibrium 
allocation of labor and capital across economic sectors. The results show up in terms of 
changes in the net value of goods traded on markets, described as Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). Likewise, CGE models can be used to estimate the environmental impacts of 
government policies that have a direct influence on income and saving behavior, since these 
will affect the degree to which people engage in forms of consumption that are 
environmentally harmful of benign. 
There is some debate about the appropriate of using CGE models to estimate the effects of 
long-term government policies, as opposed to one-off government projects. The reason is that 
one thing neo-classical economics lacks is a single well-accepted model of what causes 
growth in GDP. Growth appears to derive from technological learning, and yet learning itself 
is poorly understood, and in some cases itself at odds with assumptions of rational action 
(Solow, 1956). Every CGE model takes as its starting point the sectoral allocations of labor 
and capital, assumes these to constitute the current equilibrium, and then evaluates how a 
government project will change this. In the case of long-term policies, however, the effects of 
the policy will be felt on top of a changing technological landscape, and in turn an evolving 
allocation across sectors. Since there is no good way to predict this changing landscape, any 
effort to predict the marginal effects of government policy upon it are also suspect. 
Uncertainty is an issue for CGE modeling in terms of parameter values, such as the effects of 
environmental quality on economic productivity. The traditional approach to dealing with 
uncertainty in CGE modeling was to conduct sensitivity analysis, by picking several 
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alternative parameter values, rerunning the model, and seeing the extent to which the final 
results change. In the last decade, it has become more common practice to run a CGE model 
within a Monte Carlo framework, drawing the parameter values from known distributions, if 
these are available, running the model many times, and thus obtaining a distribution of GDP 
effects as a result of the project or policy (Abler et al., 1999). 
3.2.3 Expected utility and welfare analysis 
Neo-classical economics rests on a foundation not of money, but of utility, as the thing that 
people are trying to maximize (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). Utility is the 
enjoyment that people get from using and consuming goods. The standard assumption is that 
people derive decreasing marginal utility from increasing quantities of a particular good that 
is consumed: while they enjoy the second salmon steak that they eat in a day, their enjoyment 
is less than it was for the first salmon steak of the same quality. Similarly, when people use 
money to purchase the goods that they then can enjoy, the derive diminishing marginal utility 
from their choices: they use the first €10 to purchase something from which they derive the 
greatest utility, the next €10 to purchase the next most utility rich product, and so on. This 
gives rise to a concave utility function, shown earlier in Figure 2, an implication of which is 
that the expected utility associated with a range of outcomes is less than the utility of the 
expected outcome from that range. As already described, this in turn gives rise to risk averse 
behavior; people can raise their expected utility by sacrificing a small amount on the expected 
outcome if that can reduce the variance of the distribution.  
Welfare is essentially utility scaled up to the level of society, and as with utility there is no 
universally agreed upon functional shape (Arrow, 1951). The effect of the welfare function’s 
concavity is the same, namely that increasing the variance in the outcome of a policy, while 
holding the expected outcome constant, can have a negative effect on welfare. Welfare also 
includes ideas of equity, with an increase in variance in individual consumption suggesting a 
lower overall societal welfare than one where all people’s income is closer to the average. 
Ignoring the fact that welfare is not simply an additive function of individual utility will lead 
to biased results for policies that have a large effect on welfare and for which the uncertainties 
are large. The implication is that for such policies, it is essential to expressly model the effects 
of parameter uncertainty on the outcome of the policy, and where possible the distributional 
effects throughout society. Given a lack of agreement on a single functional form, the results 
can be expressed in terms of range of net benefits and costs on a range of actors within 
society, which can then be inputs to an informal decision-making method. 
3.2.4 Inter-temporal discounting 
An important aspect of valuation is the discounting of costs and benefits based on when they 
accrue. Usually people count costs and benefits less, or discount them, the further in the 
future they accrue. Two factors drive the urge to discount. First, empirical research 
demonstrates that when given a choice between a fixed amount of consumption in the present 
or in the future, they prefer it in the present. Indeed the further out into the future the 
consumption will take place, the less they value it. Second, investments into productive 
capital generate positive returns that people experience over time, and the total value of the 
investment and the stream of revenue will grow into the future. In equilibrium, the rate of 
return on investment will match people’s rate of time preference. Most economists take this to 
be about 5% per year, give or take a percentage point or two, applied in an exponential 
functional form. When conducting CEA or CBA, then, they discount all future costs and 
benefits into net present value (NPV) terms using this discount rate. 
Discussions about discounting and about uncertainty don’t often overlap, but there are a few 
cases where they do. First, Newell and Pizer (2003) have shown that when the discount rates 
at any point in time in the future are uncertain, using their expected value to derive a single 
NPV yields  an NPV that is lower than if one calculates a distribution of NPV’s based on the 
 (20) 
distribution of discount rates over time, and then calculates the expected value of the 
distribution of NPV’s. What does this mean? It means that uncertainty in discount rates 
matters, and the time of averaging should take place after the application of discounting, 
rather than before. 
A second area of overlap between discounting and uncertainty has to do with the relationship 
between consumption and utility or welfare, which is concave. This leads to the result that it 
is appropriate to use higher discount rates for consumption, if consumption is going to be 
growing into the future. If consumption is expected to fall into the future, the marginal utility 
from that consumption will be higher, and lower the discount rate on consumption is 
appropriate. This result is what led Stern (2007) to use a very low discount rate (1%) for 
climate change impacts, because he observed that there was good probability that climate 
impacts would lead to dramatically decreasing consumption over time. Ideally, the discount 
rate applied to future consumption should be contingent on the path of consumption itself. 
This means that when there is uncertainty about consumption in the future, the time of 
averaging should be after the application of the discount rate, and not before. 
The third area of overlap is in the field of behavioral economics. Chesson and Viscusi (2000), 
among others, have noted that individuals conflate the time and the uncertainty dimensions of 
problems; they treat events that will happen with certainty in the far future as equivalent to 
events that are do happen with high uncertainty in the present. This suggests a value to 
communication methods that help people to overcome this issue, when decisions are being 
made in an informal process, such as a political forum or by individuals in the absence of a 
formal method. 
3.2.5 Options and the value of waiting for information 
In some decision problems, an important consideration is the extent to which new information 
will reduce current uncertainty. Consider the case of building a sea wall, and it is not known 
whether the expected level of sea level rise over the lifetime of the wall will be 50 or 100 
centimeters, but it is expected that scientific study currently under way will reveal the correct 
answer within the next five years. One response might be to wait for this information before 
committing to a seawall of a particular height. At the same time, however, there may be a cost 
to waiting, such as because it will expose communities to a higher level of risk during that 
time. Calculating the cost of waiting is fairly easy, but calculating the benefits, essentially the 
value of leaving options open, can be more difficult. 
The practice of valuing options extends the furthest in financial markets, where analysts use a 
number of models, such as the Black-Shoals option-pricing model, which relies on particular 
assumptions about market price movements and volatility. For other types of investments, 
such as adaptation projects, modeling the value of waiting can proceed on a more ad-hoc 
basis, often utilizing decision-trees. 
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Figure 7 (previous page): Calculating the value of waiting. Imagine that building a 
high seawall costs € 2 million, and a low seawall €1 million, but if you build a low 
seawall and sea level rise turns out to be high (something you currently estimate 
with 50% likelihood), you will suffer € 5 million in damages. Given the choice 
between these two options, you will build the high seawall, as its expected cost is € 
2 million, compared to € 3.5 million for the low seawall. Alternatively you can wait 
until you know the actual value of se level rise. The expected construction cost will 
be €1.5 million, and the value of waiting is therefore € 500,000. If the expected 
losses associated with waiting are less than this € 500,000, you will wait, while if 
they are greater than € 500,000, you will immediately build a high seawall. 
Figure 7 provides a simple example of how to use a decision-tree to calculate the value of 
waiting. Note that to engage in the necessary calculations, it was essential to know the 
probability density function of the uncertain parameter, namely the exact amount of sea level 
rise. This is a general feature of all attempts to calculate the value of waiting, as the value is 
quite sensitive to the precise probabilities. In Figure 7, we also assumed that expected value 
was the output desired for decision-makers. We could have also given the distribution of 
costs, to support a welfare analysis.  
One important implication of the fact that it can sometimes make sense to wait for more 
information is that an appraisal of the possibility of uncertainty being reduced in the future is 
itself an important piece of information, and one that can mislead if not done right. Suarez 
and Patt (2004) provide a concrete example of this in the case of climate adaptation. As 
Oppenheimer at al. (2008) note, however, analysts often overestimate the rate at which 
learning will take place, to the point at which they note appraised uncertainty actually rising 
over time, when analysts had predicted the opposite (O’Neill and Melnikov, 2008; Webster et 
al., 2008). Interestingly, this effect is related to observation that most people tend to 
underestimate the full range of uncertainty, an effect known in the behavioral economics 
literature as overconfidence (Gordon and Kammen, 1996; Odean, 1999). If analysts do in fact 
underestimate the range of climate uncertainty, something that Morgan and Keith (1995) 
observed, then the first effects of new information are often to cause analysts to correct this 
overconfidence, widening the stated or assessed range, rather than narrowing it. 
3.2.6 Portfolio valuation and correlation 
The final important issue has to do with the correlation and covariance between separate 
uncertain events, which then influences the value of a portfolio of adaptation measures to deal 
with them. From utility and welfare theory, we know that the consequences of negative bad 
events is not simply additive: a community’s losing its electricity for a few hours may by a 
minor problem, and losing road access for a few hours also a minor problem, but losing both 
at the same time a disaster. If the two events are independent, then the probability of them 
occurring together is simply the product of the separate likelihoods: if each happens on a 
given day with a chance of one in one thousand, then the chance of them happening together 
would be one in one million. If the two events are positively correlated—such as when they 
are cascading events—the chances are higher, while if they are negatively correlated they are 
lower. If it is uncertain whether they are positively or negatively correlated, then there would 
be band of uncertainty on the frequency of the combined event, even if the precise 
frequencies of the separate events were known. 
In the area of adaptation this could be especially important, given many climate impacts, 
some of which take the form of steady changes, and some extreme events. To deal with the 
problem, then, it is crucial that the information about correlation be considered in tandem 
with information about the negative consequences of events in combination. When the 
analysts/modelers are not the stakeholders, this can happen either when stakeholders 
communicate the full set of events that they are worried about—separately and in 
combination—to the modelers, and the modelers then provide information about each of these 
 (22) 
suits of events, taking correlation into account, or when the modelers communicate to 
stakeholders enough information that they can learn when to worry about correlation. Such 
information could, for example include the identification of the sources of uncertainty, and 
also the factors that trigger different stochastic events.  
The communication challenges associated with correlation, as well as with the value of 
information from the previous section, highlight the importance of communication processes 
that go well beyond simply identifying different events and their assessed likelihoods, letting 
the information users then figure out what to do with the information. It is to these issues of 
communication that we turn next. 
4 Communicating uncertainty for decision support 
Over the last forty years, scholars have approached the issue of risk communication from a 
number of angles, all trying to figure out and resolve the observed problem that individual 
people tend to make decisions under conditions of risk and uncertainty that are quite different 
from what professional analysts suggest is appropriate. Caricaturing the debate, economists 
tried to figure out how to deal with the fact that decision-makers are so stupid (Zeckhauser 
and Viscusi, 1990; Zeckhauser and Viscusi, 1996), while sociologists tried to figure out what 
to do about the fact that the professional analysts are so insensitive  (Irwin and Wynne, 1996; 
Shackley and Wynne, 1996).  
Roughly speaking, the two groups of researchers began to meet in the middle sometime 
around the mid-1990’s, and started seeing the problem as a mismatch between the two 
communities born out of a number of reasons. Fischhoff (1995, 138), for example, expressed 
the sentiment of the economic community and what it had learned over time when he wrote: 
• All we have to do is get the numbers right 
• All we have to do is tell them the numbers 
• All we have to do is explain what we mean by the numbers 
• All we have to do is show them that they’ve accepted similar risks in the past 
• All we have to do is show them that it’s a good deal for them 
• All we have to do is treat them nice 
• All we have to do is make them partners 
• All of the above 
To resolve the mismatch, or at least deal with it, researchers have taken as its starting point 
that an assessment and communication process is likely to be effective when it produces 
information that is salient, credible, and legitimate (Cash et al., 2003; Mitchell et al., 2006). 
What is a legitimate source of information? One that a decision-maker feels obliged, for 
reasons that are social and not necessarily outcome-oriented, to pay attention to and to 
respect. To examine the factors that influence these three variables, researchers have focused 
on the substance of communication (what is said), the form of communication (how it is said), 
and the interactions involved (who is saying it to whom). That is the approach we will take 
here. Importantly, none of it relates specifically to uncertainty per se, but rather to the 
communication of information that is itself inherently uncertain.  
4.1 Substance 
The first issue with respect to uncertainty communication is what information to 
communicate. This can include certain parameters about the probability distribution or 
confidence estimate, and well as information about where those parameters came from. While 
the former is important for information salience, the latter can be valuable for both salience 
and credibility. 
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4.1.1 Deterministic prediction 
In the presence of a great deal of uncertainty, many people suggest that analysts try not to 
communicate the full range of what might happen, or information about its distribution, but 
rather a single projection of what will happen, taking the most likely future as if it were the 
certain future. This represents one parameter of a potential distribution of outcomes, namely 
either the mean, the median, or the mode. It can be a value (e.g. sea level rise will be 50 cm 
by 2100) or a probability (e.g., the likelihood of flooding will rise from 1% annually to 3% 
annually) 
There are two reasons typically given for communicating a single central estimate. The first is 
based on the psychological model of decision-making, surmising that if the analyst gives 
people a simpler story, one without uncertainty, they are more likely to understand it and use 
it. The second is based on the political model of decision-making, surmising that if the analyst 
gives a political body anything less than certainty, it will take no action. 
Both may be correct. However, there is also abundant evidence to suggest that this is a risky 
strategy, risky first because people often are savvy enough to know that the analyst is hiding 
something, and second because sooner or later the world will not turn out as the analyst 
predicts. For both reasons, the result will be a loss of credibility, often lasting for a long time, 
undermining future communication attempts by the analyst (Glantz, 2000; Orlove and 
Tosteson, 1999; Wynne, 1996). This problem is most acute in short terms predictions, such as 
those over days, weeks, or months, as in the case of seasonal climate forecasts. The loss of 
credibility through inaccuracy is less of an issue for longer-term projections, such as decadal 
climate projections. In the latter case, few people will remember what the analysts had 
originally predicted. 
4.1.2 Scenarios 
As already discussed, one way of handling a subset of the uncertainty in future projections is 
to break these off into a set of scenarios.  Until recently, the most commonly used scenarios in 
climate change research and assessment were the four sets of SRES scenarios (Nakicenovic 
and Swart, 2000), although the set of scenarios developed for the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment has also been popular. The SRES scenarios follow a set of four basic storylines: 
• A1: Focus on economic development, high global integration 
• A2: Focus on economic development, low global integration 
• B1: Focus on ecological and social sustainability, high global integration 
• B2: Focus on ecological and social sustainability, low global integration 
Each scenario presents an internally consistent story of future economic and social 
development, at global, regional, and national scales. There are a number of indicators 
available for each scenario, including population (broken down into urban and rural), GDP, 
and CO2 emissions, for each five-year increment through 2100. These scenarios have 
provided input data for a large number of other studies, including climate and input scenarios 
(which explore the implications of the emissions pathways on climate), as well as 
vulnerability and adaptation scenarios (Patt et al., 2010b; Schröter et al., 2005).  
One of the recognized limitations of the SRES scenarios is that they all represent baseline 
scenarios, i.e., scenarios in which there is no explicit climate mitigation action. To address 
this, the IPCC has set about replacing the SRES scenarios with a new set, known as 
Representative Concentration Pathways, or RCP’s. These have been completed. A task now 
underway is developing a set of social and policy storylines consistent with them. 
An important feature of scenarios, as they are currently used, is that they are expressly not 
probabilistic. None of them captures the future with any specific degree of likelihood; rather 
 (24) 
they are the first half of an “if … then” statement. In this way they permit the bounding off of 
certain areas of uncertainty, namely uncertainty about the future policy and development 
pathway of the world, the result of innumerable human decisions. 
There has been little social scientific literature on the use of scenarios as a communication 
tool. In one of the only empirical studies, Dessai et al. (2005) examined the use of climate 
scenarios for adaptation planning in the several countries, and found that their use depended 
heavily on the planning and assessment process. In those cases where plans were highly 
sensitive to future climate, unsurprisingly, the scenarios were heavily used. The fact that the 
SRES scenarios were not assigned different probabilities was a a problem for planners, as 
often their plans are sensitive to which scenario is viewed as most likely. In addition to this 
study, a special issue of Environmental Research Letters reported on an expert workshop 
devoted to reflecting on scenarios as a communication and analysis tool (O'Neill et al., 2008), 
but this did not generate important findings beyond those of the Dessai et al. (2005) study. 
Anecdotally, it does appear that many users of scenarios do confuse them for actual 
projections or predictions. This is most seriously the case with baseline, or business as usual, 
scenarios. Countless analysts, reporters, and even scientists say things like “The International 
Energy Agency projects that coal use will double by 2030,” when in reality this was just their 
baseline scenario, one possible world future based on a set of assumptions about how energy 
related policies would develop. This highlights that it is important, when communicating 
scenarios, to communicate what a scenario actually is, and what it is not. 
There are, however, two kinds of scenarios that are meant to convey some sort of predictive 
information, and these are best-case and worst-case scenarios, the tails of a probability 
distribution. Viscusi (1997) analyzed public and governmental reactions to health and safety 
risks, and discovered that when multiple scenarios were presented, one of which was a “worst 
case scenario,” this is the one that influenced their decision-making the most. Viscusi (1997) 
and others (Leiss, 1996; Sunstein, 2002) criticize the use of worst case scenarios as 
contributing to alarmist, rather than productive, decision-making. When presenting worst-case 
scenarios, then, it is important to identify explicitly the factors that would have to come 
together to bring it about, giving the decision-maker the opportunity to judge whether this is 
indeed something to worry about. 
4.1.3 Probability distributions and confidence estimates 
The alternative to communicating a point estimate, whether it is the central tendency as in 
deterministic information, or a distribution tail as in best- or worst-case scenarios, is to 
convey more complete information about the spread and shape of the estimate distribution of 
outcomes, or the confidence with which scientists made point projections. This information 
forms the basis for making sound decision-making following the economic model, and thus 
constitutes the essential thing to communicate. As we shall describe in section 5, most of the 
formal guidance on uncertainty communication highlights the importance of communicating 
this information. 
There are two problems, however. First, it is often difficult to quantify the exact probability 
density function or confidence estimate. In such cases, as Risbey and Kandlikar (2007) note, 
it is important to communicate only that which is known, even if it falls far short of what an 
economic decision-making model such as CBA would take as an input. Often this takes the 
form of qualitative statements, together with a great deal of explanation to make sure that they 
are well understood. The second problem is that when decisions are being made according to 
non-economic models, the provision of complete uncertainty information can obscure the 
most important pieces of information, leading to worse decisions. In the political mode, for 
example, showing a wide distribution would simply lead to no decision-being taken, even if 
the central tendency of the distribution would suggest that the optimal decision would be to 
depart significantly from the status quo. Together, the two problems highlight the importance 
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of paying attention to both the form and the interactions involved. They also suggest that 
providing information on other features of the information may be useful, as we describe in 
the next section. 
4.1.4 Sources and pedigree of information and uncertainty 
Even if a full probability density function or confidence estimate is known, and especially 
when they are not, there are other pieces of information that decision-makers find useful to 
help them to understand what to do with the reality of uncertainty. Several empirical results, 
many from our own research, highlight this. Patt (2007) used experimental methods to 
examine whether the difference between uncertainty derived from model ensemble runs and 
from expert disagreement mattered to decision-makers. He found it to matter in two ways. 
First, decision-makers updated their own probability estimates to a greater extent in the face 
of model ensemble estimates, and by contrast were relatively insensitive to changes in the 
numbers of experts lining up on one side of a debate or the other. Second, decision-makers 
were more likely to take action, to make a change from the status quo, when the uncertainty 
derived from expert disagreement, rather than from the modeling itself. Suarez and Patt 
(2004), as already described, found that decision-makers liked to know potential information 
that could, if received, allow them to change their strategies. Along with Patt and Gwata 
(2002), they also found that decision-makers found it useful to understand the physical 
sources for uncertainty, so that they could gauge the overall reliability of the information 
relative to their existing beliefs and knowledge. 
For all of these reasons, a number of scholars have suggested an approach to communicating 
uncertainty that goes beyond the simple distribution parameters (Dessai and van der Sluijs, 
2007; van der Sluijs et al., 2005). The NUSAP approach (to be found at www.nusap.net), 
developed by a team of researchers working closely with Jerome Ravetz and Silvio 
Funtowicz, stands for five categories, corresponding well to the information that experimental 
science can provide information on: 
• Numeral. This is the quantity meaning to be conveyed. It can be a number like 5 or 17 
or 33, or a more general one like “a million,” which is different in that a million plus 
12 is still a million, and not 1,000,012.  
• Unit. This is usually straightforward, but sometimes not. A notable case of the latter 
is for monetary units, which change over time; this would then include the year at 
which the monetary unit is evaluated, as in 2010 €. 
• Spread. This is some sort of information about how wide the distribution is from the 
central tendency. It can be expressed in terms of confidence intervals, standard errors, 
or a ± type of thing.  It is important to differentiate this from the Numeral, as it is 
often of a very different character. 
• Assessment. This represents a qualitative judgment about the reliability of the 
information. In standard science, this has often been the test of whether it is 
significant at the 95% confidence level, this being the cutoff for a qualitative 
judgment of reliability. In policy-oriented science and assessment, this could be an 
appraisal of whether a forecast is optimistic or pessimistic. 
• Pedigree. This is information about where the information has come from, such as 
from model ensemble runs, expert focus groups, or elsewhere. It is essential for the 
users of the information to judge how to value it in relationship to what they already 
know.  
As soon as one relaxes the assumption that decision-makers are following a mechanistic 
decision-making process, but instead are applying judgment, intuition, or even group debate, 
then providing this additional information becomes essential if the analysis is to lead to wise 
choices. 
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4.1.5 Events versus actions 
A final distinction with respect to content is between event warnings and action warnings. For 
example, a government agency (e.g., the hydrological and meteorological department) could 
inform valley residents about a high likelihood of excessive rains, which could lead to 
flooding. Alternatively, the government could tell people to evacuate an area because of a risk 
of flooding. The former allows individuals to reach their own decisions about what to do with 
the information. This can be good, because it respects the fact that each resident has a 
different set of factors that are also important, such as whether the person’s house was built to 
withstand a flood. It can also be bad, because many people may lack the analytic capacity to 
figure out when an appropriate time to take action may be. The action warning often provides 
more salient information. However, it may not recognize the diversity that exists within the 
target population. Moreover, the agency may suffer a higher loss of credibility if the action 
proves to be a waste of time, such as when people evacuate but no flood actually arrives. 
A number of studies have shown that the choice of strategy should depend to a large extent on 
the complexity of the analysis that is required to translate the event warning into an 
appropriate action, and on the degree to which people feel that their particular needs are taken 
into account in the translation. Looking at the use of probabilistic seasonal climate forecasts 
for sectoral specific adaptations, such as improved dam management, disaster preparation, or 
malaria control, Patt et al. (2007) found that the use of the information depended entirely on 
the preparation of an action warning. Using the information was otherwise too complicated. 
At the same time, when action warnings based on the forecasts were communicated to 
farmers at a national level, such as to plant especially drought tolerant crops, and clearly did 
not respect local differences, farmers were reluctant to trust the forecasts (Patt, 2006). By 
contrast when the action warning was developed at the local level, with the involvement of 
farmers, they were trusted (Patt et al., 2005). Wynne (1996) observed the same effect, looking 
at government warnings to farmers at the time of a accident release of radioactive material at 
the Sellafield nuclear power station in England. 
This is ongoing research, and several important questions remain, such as whether the 
description of sources of uncertainty, and other NUSAP-related issues, needs to take on a 
different character in action versus event warnings. The researcher Upasna Sharma at the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) is conducting research on this in 
India and Europe, but her empirical results are not yet available. 
4.2 Form 
A number of issues have arisen in the literature regarding the form in which analysts 
communicate uncertainty.  These revolve around the questions of what kinds of numbers to 
use, whether to replace them with words, how to use pictures to capture all of them, and 
whether to do it all at once. The form of information influences to a large extent its salience, 
and often its credibility. 
4.2.1 Frequentist versus Bayesian probability 
Imagine the same hypothetical medical diagnosis problem framed two different ways. In the 
first framing, you know that (a) the prior probability of having HIV is 1%, (b) the test for HIV 
is 90% accurate in both directions (in terms of false positives and false negatives), and (c) you 
just tested positive. What is the chance that you actually have HIV? In the second framing, 
you know that (a) in a community of 1,000 people, 10 of them will have HIV and 990 of them 
will not, and (b) for every 10 people either with or without HIV, the test will identify 9 of 
them correctly. What proportion of the people who test positive actually has HIV? It turns out 
that most people can and do answer the second problem in their head, roughly as follows: Of 
the ten people who have HIV, 9 test positive. Of the 990 who don’t have HIV, 10% of them, 
or 99, test positive. So that means that out of 108 people testing positive, 9 actually have HIV. 
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That is one twelfth, or a little under 10%. The first framing? Most people can’t figure out the 
math, and instead answer 90%, the test reliability rate, which is the wrong answer (Wallsten 
et al., 1986). 
There are a lot of areas where analysts can choose to frame probabilities in either frequentist 
or Bayesian terms, and be technically correct, such as the medical diagnosis problem above. 
Climate change is, by and large, not one of those areas. With climate change, there is no such 
thing as a large sample of identical places each having an equal likelihood of facing a 
particular climate impact. At the same time, however, it is clear that most people find working 
with probabilities expressed in frequentist terms substantially easier. Because of this, there 
may be value in analysts describing climate change, accurately, in Bayesian terms, but then 
drawing an analogy to a frequentist problem of the same character. Suarez and Patt (2004) 
report on doing so in the area of seasonal climate forecasting, drawing an analogy to betting 
on football games, with apparent success at triggering the right computation among an 
audience of subsistence farmers in Zimbabwe. 
4.2.2 Numbers versus words 
A second issue that has arisen is the use of words to represent ranges of assessed likelihood or 
confidence, not in terms of using ninety percent to represent 90%, but rather words like 
“likely” or “very likely” to represent probabilities greater than 66% or 90%, respectively. As 
we will discuss later, this was an approach taken by the IPCC, with varying degree of 
uniformity across working groups, since the Third Assessment Report released in 2001. It is 
an appealing idea, since people remember verbal descriptions better than they do numbers 
(Bruine de Bruin et al., 2000). However, empirical studies identified potential pitfalls. 
The first study dates to 1980, and found that when physicians used words to describe 
probabilities of particular medical conditions, there was a great amount of confusion, in terms 
of different people using and understanding the same words to represent very different ranges 
of probability (Bryant, 1980). An early follow up study, by psychologists, found first that 
different contexts influenced how verbal probabilities were understood, and second that most 
people underestimated the degree of miscommunication that such words led to (Brun and 
Teigen, 1988). In the area of climate communication specifically, Patt and Schrag (2003) 
found a conflation between the magnitude or seriousness of the event being described, and the 
link between particular works to describe particular probability ranges: people used more 
serious sound words to describe a given probability attached to more serious events; likewise, 
they corrected for this anticipated bias by interpreting probability words as corresponding to 
lower numerical probability ranges for the more serious events. The authors concluded that 
the IPCC practice of using particular probability words to represent particular numerical 
ranges, if not understood by the readers, could lead towards a bias, namely an underestimate 
on readers’ parts of the likelihoods of the more serious events. To be sure, the IPCC reports 
have stated the probability scale that they are using. A follow up study to Patt and Schrag 
(2003), by Patt and Dessai (2005), found the bias to persist even among climate experts who 
reported having read the IPCC report in which the particular probability scale was identified. 
These results suggest that when words are used to represent numerical probability ranges, it is 
important to highlight, and highlight again, the correspondence between the two.  
4.2.3 Pictures 
Pictures are widely used to communicate uncertainty, and yet in the case of climate change 
there appears to be little literature either on best practices, or on the bases for evaluating 
whether one picture is better than another. In one of the only empirical studies on the use of 
graphs to communicate probability, Ibrekk and Morgan (1987) found that most people, even 
those with some exposure to statistics, had a difficult time correctly interpreting a graph 
depicting a cumulative probability function. 
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Tufte (1982) was an early pioneer in describing successful means of presenting quantitative 
information visually, and while his focus was not on uncertainty per se, many of his 
fundamental lessons remain valuable. A core lesson is a focus on simplicity, identifying the 
core quantity to convey, and representing that with variation in one particular manner, 
whether it be through change in color, distance along a line or axis, or change in area. This 
can go for uncertainty communication as well, and in this respect there are two pieces of 
information often to be conveyed: the spread of the numeric estimate, often in proportion to 
the numeric estimate itself; the confidence in an estimate, often in relation to the confidence 
in other estimates, and often expressed in qualitative terms or with thresholds (e.g., 
statistically significant estimates of difference versus insignificant ones). What Tufte (1982) 
and others agree on is that the biggest hindrance to clarity is often the attempt to convey too 
much information with the same picture. 
With this in mind, there are countless ways to communicate, visually, such uncertainty 
quantities. Box plots, mean values with bars representing standard errors of confidence 
intervals, and probability density curves all convey essentially the same information about 
spread, and which is most appropriate depends on the particular data and the particular 
audience. Variations in color, in size, or in boldness of text can convey differences in 
likelihood or confidence, and again the exact choice is context dependent. 
The developers of NUSAP have also developed one particular figure to go with it, namely a 
“kite diagram” to illustrate the pedigree component. This relies on a matrix of factors and 
ratings, where ultimately each factor takes on a rating from 0 to 4. Figure 8, below, shows the 
matrix, and an example of a kite diagram, as created using their online system. Note, 
however, that Wardekker et al. (2008) found that people had a difficult time correctly 
interpreting the kite diagram, again because it is too complicated. 
 
Figure 8: NUSAP Pedigree matrix and resulting Kite diagram for a randomly 
chosen pedigree vector. Source: www.nusap.net 
4.2.4 Progressive disclosure 
A final approach to the form of uncertainty communication pertains to the order in which 
decision makers receive it.  A great deal of research in psychology shows that when people 
receive too much information at one time, or information that too seriously conflicts with 
their pre-existing beliefs, they will be inclined to ignore, reject, or simply not act on the whole 
package of information (Mosler et al., In Press; Prentice-Dunn and Rogers, 1986). This then 
supports the recommendation of Pereira and Quintana (2002) and Kloprogge et al (2007), 
building on the NUSAP approach, to present information about uncertainty not all at once, 
but in a series of steps, each one of which prepares the recipient to receive, accept, and act on 
the next. “Progressive disclosure” is the term that they use, borrowing from the field of 
human computer interaction—such as in web-page design—intended to focus users’ attention 
 (29) 
and reduce their cognitive workload, by staging information in a sequential manner. To 
implement the progressive disclosure approach, Kloprogge et al. (2007) suggest structuring 
communication in a set of layers, with the user first encountering the outer layer, and then 
being able to “zoom in” to one or more inner layers. Table 1, below, shows their 
recommendation for structuring these layers. 
Table 1: Progressive disclosure. Source: Kloprogge et al. (2007) 
 
4.3 Interactions 
The further one moves away from a purely economic descriptive model of decision-making, 
the more it matters who is involved in the communication, what their relationship is to the 
intended user of the information, and how the two interact. These factors influence the 
credibility and legitimacy of information. Indirectly, they also influence salience, if the form 
of interaction generates the exchange of information that would not otherwise have taken 
place. 
4.3.1 Credibility enhancing credentials and relationships 
There is a large literature, to a large extent rooted in the field of science and technology 
studies (STS), showing how the particular relationship between the communicator of 
scientific information and the user of that information influences the information’s credibility 
and legitimacy. Scholars have pointed to a particular kind of communication organization as 
often being best suited to this task as one that crosses the boundary between science and 
policy or decision-making, and hence is known as a “boundary organization” (Guston, 1999; 
2001). The critical feature of such an organization is that it has accountability to both 
communities (Cash et al., 2003). Cash et al. (2006), for example, conducted case study 
analysis of different organizations charged with developing and communicating probabilistic 
seasonal climate forecasts; they found that those organizations that had clear ties to the user 
communities, ties as strong as those to the scientific community, managed to be more 
effective in having their advice acted upon. Partly this had to do with developing different 
content, which was more salient to decision-makers, matching the results of Patt et al. (2007). 
They also found, however, that the better boundary organizations were simply trusted more, 
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and held to be a more legitimate source of information.  
Patt et al. (2006) examined the same research question, but using a very different method, 
namely controlled economic experiment, in which they were able to keep the information 
content the same. Participants in the study played a probabilistic game, in which they had 
some chance of winning money, and in which the optimal strategy—the one that would 
maximize their likelihood of winning—was somewhat counterintuitive.  A third party gave 
the participants advice, correct advice, about the optimal strategy. The relationship between 
the advisor and the game player varied across experimental treatments, however. In the 
control condition, the advisor was not seen to have had a financial stake. In a second 
treatment, the game player had the option of paying money to receive the advice, and 
otherwise played without advice. In a third treatment, the advisor provided the advice for free, 
but won the same amount of money as the game player, and thus had a visible incentive to 
provide accurate advice. A fourth group of participants received no advice at all. Participants 
played the game two times, under the same conditions. The first time they played it, the only 
advice-giving condition that changed their strategy from the one where they received no 
advice was that in which they had to pay for the advice. The second time they played, the 
results depended on whether the advice had led, or would have led, to a winning outcome, 
something it usually but always did. When the advice had been observed to have led to a 
winning outcome, the two conditions where the advisor received money (either paid in 
advance, or winning afterwards) had the same effect, and both improved performance over no 
advice or advice in the absence of any financial incentive. When the advice was observed to 
have led to a losing outcome, only the advisors who could win money were observed to have 
improved performance, while the advisors paid in advance fell in credibility to the point 
where they were no better than no advice or advice in the absence of a financial relationship. 
One could compare the advisor without a paid relationship to an NGO, the advisor paid in 
advance to a consultant, and the advisor with a stake in the winning outcome as a boundary 
organization. In the presence of uncertainty, where the advice sometimes does lead to poor 
results, the boundary organization was the only option that gave people advice that people 
actually listened to. 
4.3.2 Participation 
It has been increasingly recognized that there is great value in face-to-face interaction 
between analysts and decision-makers (Cash et al., 2003). Various aspects of participatory 
processes enhance its salience, credibility, and legitimacy, respectively: 
• Salience. Participation can enhance salience by allowing decision-makers to inform 
analysts what their true problems are, so that the analysts can modify their 
information content to make it more useful. VanDeveer (2006) and Andonova (2006) 
both examined participatory processes in which there were different levels of 
participation, from active contribution to discussion, to simply showing up and sitting 
silent in the back of the room. Not surprisingly, they found that salience was achieved 
for the active participants, but not the inactive ones. 
• Credibility. Participation allows decision-makers to ask questions, better understand 
the information, and ultimately trust it more. This can be especially the case in the 
context of high degrees of uncertainty. Patt and Gwata (2002) and Suarez and Patt 
(2004) both found higher degrees of trust in scientific information following a 
participatory process than following a non-participatory one, in the context of a high 
degree of uncertainty. 
• Legitimacy. Decision-makers, especially in economically or socially marginalized 
communities, may not respect information coming from elite scientists as reflecting 
their own particular needs, and may even suspect bad motives behind its production 
and communication. Participation can reverse this, by helping them to feel a part of 
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translating scientific information into practical conclusions. Biermann (2006) 
observed, for example, that developing countries that were under-represented in 
global environmental assessment chapter writing teams were less likely to view the 
results as policy-relevant, irrespective of the scientific content, while those that had 
participated more were also more likely to value the results. 
The studies cited above all provided qualitative difference that participating makes in the 
communication of uncertain scientific information. The only study that we are aware of that 
has documented it quantitatively has been Patt et al. (2005). As we have already discussed, 
this study built on a five year controlled experiment in four African villages, communicating 
probabilistic seasonal climate forecasts over the radio to one group in each village, and via 
participatory workshops to another group. The group that had participated in the workshops 
were about five times as likely to apply the information to their decisions.   
4.3.3 Participatory modeling and interactive software 
One particular twist on participation is the incorporation of numeric computer models into an 
interactive process. This can take two forms. In one form, a model is available online, and 
decision-makers can play with it to explore the implications of the model for their decisions. 
This was one approach taken, for example, in the UK Climate Impacts Programme (Willows 
and Connel, 2003). It is also the approach taken with the progressive disclosure of 
information, although that would typically not require a model to run. Remarkably, we found 
almost no studies that have evaluated the success of such software. The one that we did find, 
by Häubl and Trifts (2000), examined whether interactive software in an online shopping 
environment allowed consumers to arrive at better decisions faster than a non-interactive 
version. The result, unsurprisingly, was that it did improve decision efficiency and outcome. 
There was no mention of uncertainty in this study, however. 
The second, stronger version of participatory modeling is to include the modeling in a 
participatory environment, where modelers and decision-makers can use the software together 
to explore the impacts of decisions. This approach has a long history, with one of the earliest 
successful example being the development of the RAINS model of acid transport and 
deposition in Europe in the late 1980’s, which was used by negotiators in arriving at the 
second sulfur protocol to the Treaty on the Long Range Transport of Air Pollutants (Farrell 
and Keating, 2006). Since then the practice of developing models to use with stakeholders has 
become fairly common, allowing the exploration of key uncertainties and risks, with 
qualitative analysis suggesting the practice to be useful (Krolikowska et al., 2007; Martin et 
al., 2007; Walker et al., 2002). 
4.3.4 Games 
A final participatory approach to communication is the use of role-playing games. A number 
of researchers have experimented with the use of games to model the decision of whether to 
purchase crop insurance. Peterson and Mullally (2009) and Dinku et al. (2009) report on the 
use of games in a pilot project in Ethiopia to help explain concepts of uncertainty and 
probability to farmers, to aid them in making the decision to purchase insurance. Patt et al. 
(2010a) report on a similar practice in Ethiopia and Malawi, and also conducted an empirical 
study of the results of game playing. They found no statistical difference between using a 
game to explain insurance concepts compared to using a more traditional participatory lecture 
approach. At the same time, they found the game to be a good way of probing participants 
interest in purchasing different insurance products, as their behavior playing the game 
correlated well with their later stated preferences. Patt et al. (2009) report on similar results 
from a number of different studies in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Games may be an 
important way of exploring tacit knowledge, namely knowledge that people were not 
previously consciously aware that they had. One example is knowledge about why people 
make particular decisions—what factors are important to them—which is often impossible to 
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identify in an abstract context, but can be identified when immediately reflecting on one’s 
own behavior. 
5 Selected guidelines for uncertainty communication 
There have been a number of guidelines written for the analysis and communication of 
uncertainty in the context of climate change. We cannot provide an exhaustive list of all such 
efforts, but rather focus on three particularly important ones.  
5.1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), as most readers are likely aware, 
was created by the United Nations General Assembly in 1988, as a partnership between the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO). As the WMO is based in Geneva, that is where the IPCC’s secretariat 
sits as well. The purpose of the IPCC is to draw together the world’s leading scientists to 
assess the state of climate science, in order to inform national governments and international 
negotiations. Shortly after its conception, the IPCC released its First Assessment Report 
(FAR), which served as the scientific basis for negotiating the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It released its Second Assessment Report (SAR) 
in 1995, which served as the scientific basis for negotiating the Kyoto Protocol. Since then it 
has released two more assessment reports, and is currently engaged on a fifth. It has also 
released a number of special reports on diverse issues. The IPCC is divided into three 
working groups (WG’s), with WGI covering the scientific basis of climate change, WGII 
covering issues of impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation, and WGIII covering issues of 
climate change mitigation, namely the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. In the course of 
preparing the assessment reports and special reports, each of the WG’s scopes out the 
structure of report in terms of separate chapters, and then appoints chapter writing teams from 
the pool of scientists that national governments have nominated. 
The IPCC’s specific attention to the issue of uncertainty began with the Third Assessment 
Report (TAR), written between 1997 and 2001, with the preparation of a background paper 
and guidelines for author teams. Following inconsistent uptake of the guidelines by the 
different working groups in the TAR, the IPCC organized an expert meeting to prepare for the 
Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), from which it drafted a new set of guidelines. These have 
recently been superceded by guidelines for the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), currently in 
preparation. 
5.1.1 Third Assessment Report 
In the process of drafting the TAR, the IPCC recognized a number of cross-cutting themes, 
namely intersecting many chapters and multiple working groups. These included 
uncertainties, as well as other topic such as costing methods, frameworks for decision-
making, scenarios, and perspectives on development, equity, and sustainability (DES). To 
provide guidance to authors, the IPCC organized expert meetings on DES and on costing 
methods, and commissioned a number of background papers, which it bundled together in 
Pachauri et al. (2000). Richard Moss, a policy scientist from the Battelle Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory in the United States, and Stephen Schneider, a professor at Stanford 
University and editor in chief of the leading journal Climatic Change, wrote the twenty-page 
chapter on uncertainties (Moss and Schneider, 2000), acknowledging comments on earlier 
drafts from a long list of leading climate change experts. These experts included Granger 
Morgan, notable because he guided the SAP5.2 paper, described below, and Rob Swart, 
coordinator of the MEDIATION project. 
Moss and Schneider (2000) began by recognizing that the IPCC, in the first and second 
assessment reports, had often used inconsistent and confusing language and methods to 
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describe uncertainty. Before then making specific suggestions on methods to improve 
consistency and clarity, the authors made the general comment that it is Bayesian uncertainty 
that most frequently pervades issues reported on in the TAR. They characterized this by 
saying that the “probability of an event is the degree of belief that exists among lead authors 
and reviewers that the event will occur, given the observations, modeling results, and theory 
currently available” (Moss and Schneider, 2000, p. 36).  
The authors then presented a list of six necessary steps and one optional step to follow in the 
presentation of all results in the TAR, in order to represent uncertainty clearly and 
consistently. In their exact words (Moss and Schneider, 2000, p. 37), these could be 
summarized as follows: 
1. For each of the major findings you expect to be developed in your chapter, identify 
the most important factors and uncertainties that are likely to affect the conclusions. 
Also specify which important factors/variables are being treated exogenously or 
fixed, as it will almost always be the case that some important components will be 
treated in this way when addressing the complex phenomena examined in the TAR.  
2. Document ranges and distributions in the literature, including sources of information 
on the key causes of uncertainty. Note that it is important to consider the types of 
evidence available to support a finding (e.g., distinguish findings that are well 
established through observations and tested theory from those that are not so 
established).  
3. Given the nature of the uncertainties and state of science, make an initial 
determination of the appropriate level of precision—is the state of science such that 
only qualitative estimates are possible, or is quantification possible, and if so, to how 
many significant digits? As the assessment proceeds, recalibrate level of precision in 
response to your assessment of new information.  
4. Quantitatively or qualitatively characterize the distribution of values that a parameter, 
variable, or outcome may take. First identify the end points of the range that the 
writing team establishes, and/or any high consequence, low probability outcomes or 
“outliers.” Particular care needs to be taken to specify what portion of the range is 
included in the estimate (e.g., this is a 90% confidence interval) and what the range is 
based on. Then provide an assessment of the general shape (e.g., uniform, bell, 
bimodal, skewed, symmetric) of the distribution. Finally, provide your assessment of 
the central tendency of the distribution (if appropriate).  
5. Using the terms described below, rate and describe the state of scientific information 
on which the conclusions and/or estimates (i.e. from step 4) are based.  
6. Prepare a “traceable account” of how the estimates were constructed that describes 
the writing team’s reasons for adopting a particular probability distribution, including 
important lines of evidence used, standards of evidence applied, approaches to 
combining/reconciling multiple lines of evidence, explicit explanations of methods 
for aggregation, and critical uncertainties.  
7. OPTIONAL: Use formal probabilistic frameworks for assessing expert judgment (i.e. 
decision-analytic techniques), as appropriate for each writing team. 
The remainder of the chapter was devoted to spelling out greater detail about each of these 
points. Some of the most concrete suggestions addressed point 5, in that the authors proposed 
particular verbal scales and graphical techniques. One verbal scale suggested the matching of 
specific words to particular numerical ranges of Bayesian belief. Another suggested particular 
wording to represent qualitative distinctions in level of agreement and amount of evidence, 
shown below in Figure 9. The graphical tools included plots quite similar to the NUSAP kite 
diagram illustrated above in Figure 8. They also suggested the use of so-called “Tukey” box 
and whisker plots, which we show later in Figure 12. 
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Figure 9: Recommended terms to describe different combinations of level of 
agreement and amount of evidence. Source: (Moss and Schneider, 2000, p. 45). 
In the final TAR, the three working groups applied the lessons from the guidance paper to 
differing extents and in differing ways. Both WGI and WGII did attempt to follow some of 
the particular points of advice, including the use of a scale to link particular words with 
particular ranges of assessed probability. At the same time, the two working groups framed 
uncertainties somewhat differently—WGI in terms of “likelihood” and WGII in terms of 
“level of confidence”—which some noted was confusing (Manning et al., 2004).  Working 
Group III did little to incorporate the advice of the guidance paper. 
It is our own opinion that two factors might have led to the differential—and indeed poor—
uptake of the guidance paper. The first was that it was available relatively late in the TAR 
drafting process, namely July 2000. Incorporating its findings required author teams to revise 
previously drafted text. The second was that, for a document devoted to good communication 
and presentation practices, it was remarkable in its poorness of presentation. The summary list 
of key points (shown above), for example, was far wordier than most communication experts 
would advise. Figure 9, above, is another example. It was meant to describe a two 
dimensional space, with four quadrants. It is curious that the authors did not take the time to 
present it as such, perhaps drawing an attractive graph, but rather used a word processing 
program’s crude drawing function. Similar comments could be made for the other figures. 
Ultimately, the guidance paper did not provide an inspiring example of clear communication. 
5.1.2 Fourth Assessment Report 
Leading into the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), there was a desire to learn from and build 
on the experiences in the TAR. Towards that end, the Technical Support Unit for Working 
Group 1 organized an expert workshop in Maynooth, Ireland, in May 2004. With 79 
participants, the workshop featured a large number of presentations and breakout groups for 
each of the working groups to discuss. Following the workshop, the organizers drafted a 
report summarizing the proceedings (Manning et al., 2004), an Annex of which included a 
concept paper on the issue (Manning and Petit, 2004). A shortened version of the concept 
paper appeared as a guidance note for lead authors (IPCC, 2005).  
The concept note, first and foremost, summarized the key area of discussion at the workshop. 
It placed particular emphasis on the disclosure of the sources of uncertainty, dividing these 
into five general groups: incomplete or imperfect observations; incomplete conceptual 
frameworks; inaccurate prescriptions of known processes; chaos; and, lack of predictability. 
The concept note then described some of the particular concerns from each of the working 
groups. Of note is that in the progression from WGI to WGII to WGIII, there is also a 
progression from a consideration of natural systems to one including human systems, and 
then one that is almost exclusively described as a human system. In turn, the uncertainties 
take on different characteristics, and in general become harder and harder to parameterize in 
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the more human-dominated systems. The only concrete recommendations of the concept note 
were those related to process, namely how the communication of uncertainty could be 
reviewed during the preparation of the AR4. 
The guidance note provided a much more succinct restatement of many of the ideas present in 
Moss and Schneider (2000) and then repeated in Manning and Petit (2004).  It contained a 
total of fifteen bullet points, falling under five headings. We summarize them here: 
• Plan to treat issues of uncertainty and confidence. It is essential to plan early on in 
the chapter drafting, in order to have time to analyze and represent uncertainties in an 
honest and useful manner, as well as seeking input from scientists holding diverging 
views. 
• Review the information available. Consider different types of uncertainty, bearing in 
mind that empirical research has shown that structural uncertainty—the inadequacy 
of existing models to represent the system accurately—is typically underestimated by 
experts. Table 2, below, summarizes the different kinds of uncertainty, and 
approaches towards communication. 
• Make expert judgments. Make a judgment about how to characterize uncertainty, 
recognizing the tendency for groups to converge on particular viewpoints in ways that 
reveal overconfidence. Back that judgment up with a traceable account of how the 
judgment was reached. 
• Use the appropriate level of precision to describe findings. Be clear about what can 
be stated and what cannot. A spectrum from ignorance to knowledge would be:  
• A direction of change is ambiguous or unpredictable. 
• A direction of change or trend can be identified. 
• An order of magnitude for a change can be identified 
• A range or confidence interval can be given, based on objective analysis or 
expert judgment. 
• A probability of occurrence of a given event can be identified. 
• A probability distribution can be identified for changes in a continuous 
variable. 
• Communicate carefully, using calibrated language. It is important to use language 
carefully, recognizing the psychological aspects of decision-making (such that people 
react differently to an assessed 90% chance of survival compared with a 10% change 
of death). Use verbal scales such as that in Table 3, below. Use well thought out 
graphics. 
Ultimately, the guidance notes contained little advice that was different from that embodied in 
Moss and Schneider (2000), and yet did so in a way that was perhaps easier to read, and 
therefore easier to apply. With the AR4, working groups I and II became more harmonized in 
their treatment of uncertainty than they had in the TAR, although WGIII, embedded entirely 
in economics and other social sciences, remained somewhat intransigent. 
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Table 2: Typology of uncertainties. Source: IPCC (2005). 
 
Table 3: Confidence and likelihood scales. Source: IPCC (2005). 
 
 
5.1.3 Fifth Assessment Report 
The IPCC revisited the issue again for the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5). In July 2010, they 
organized a small meeting of the WG chairs and their close colleagues, which took place in 
Jasper Ridge, California (IPCC WGII, 2010).  From this meeting, a core writing team 
prepared a new guidance note for lead authors (Mastrandrea et al., 2010), similar in form to 
the guidance note prepared for the AR4 lead authors. 
In many respects, the AR5 guidance note was similar in content to the AR4 guidance note. 
One important difference is the highlighting, near the beginning of the document, of the main 
message:  
“The AR5 will rely on two metrics for communicating the degree of 
certainty in key findings:  
• Confidence in the validity of a finding, based on the type, amount, 
quality, and consistency of evidence (e.g., mechanistic understanding, 
theory, data, models, expert judgment) and the degree of agreement. 
Confidence is expressed qualitatively.  
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• Quantified measures of uncertainty in a finding expressed 
probabilistically (based on statistical analysis of observations or model 
results, or expert judgment)” (Source: Mastrandrea et al. (2010), p. 1). 
Two other changes were an updating of the suggested language and metrics for confidence, as 
shown in Figure 10, and a slight modification of the probability scale, as shown in Figure 4. 
The subtle difference for the latter is that it clarified that there would be only one bound for 
each term, such as “likely” clearly representing 66 – 100%, rather than the potential 
interpretation that it represents the range above “about as likely as not” and below “very 
likely,” i.e. 66 – 90%. 
 
Figure 10: Confidence scale in the AR5 guidance note to authors.  
Source: Mastrandrea et al. (2010), p. 3 
Table 4: Likelihood scale in the AR5 guidance note to authors.  
Source: Mastrandrea et al. (2010), p. 3 
 
As the AR5 author teams have yet to finalize initial drafts of their respective chapters, it is too 
early to see whether they will incorporate the advice from the guidance note. What is 
noteworthy is that WGIII was represented in the Jasper Ridge meeting and author team to a 
degree that it had not been in the AR4 version. This may indicate a greater buy in by WGIII 
authors than in the past. 
5.2 Dutch government 
The Dutch government operates an agency for environmental assessment (abbreviated MNP 
until 2008, since then as PBL), located geographically in the city of Bilthoven, and 
institutionally within the National Institute for Health and the Environment (RIVM) until 
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2006. In 1999, RIVM came under criticism in the media and then in political circles for 
presenting many results in a manner that some claimed was too certain, not acknowledging 
well enough the uncertainties inherent in the results. A review of RIVM environmental 
assessment activities led to the creation of a project to develop guidance on the 
communication of uncertainty in environmental assessments (Janssen et al., 2004).  
The leaders of the project were Peter H.M. Janssen, of RIVM/MNP, and Jeroen P. van der 
Sluijs, of the Copernicus Institute at the University of Utrecht. Of them, van der Sluijs was 
one of the main developers of the NUSAP methodology, and many of its core lessons became 
incorporated into the guidance developed. A series of workshops, incorporating feedback 
from stakeholders, led to a suite of products to be used at different stages, and in different 
contexts, in an environmental assessment. Figure 11 shows the products. 
a.  
b.  
Figure 11: RIVM/MNP Guidance on uncertainty assessment. Part (a) 
is the suite of products. Part (b) shows the matrix for their application. 
Source: Petersen et al. (2003). 
The starting point for consideration of uncertainty in an environmental assessment is the  
Mini-Checklist. This consists of a series of six questions, for each of which the assessment 
team has the option of answering “wholly,” “partly,” or “insufficiently,” and then providing 
additional elaboration if it is thought necessary. These questions are (quoting): 
1. Problem framing. In our assessment we pay attention to: (i) existing views on the 
problem other than the client’s (including our own view), (ii) the interwovenness 
with other problems, (iii) possibly relevant aspects of the problem that are not dealt 
with in the research questions, (iv) the role the study is expected to play in the 
policy process, and (v) the way the study connects to previous studies on the 
subject.  
 (39) 
2. Involvement of stakeholders. We have a clear picture of: (i) the relevant 
stakeholders, (ii) their views and roles with respect to the problem, and (iii) the 
problem aspects about which they disagree. On the basis of all this, we have 
decided if, how (in formulating research questions, contributing information/data, 
evaluating findings/results), and when (in the beginning, during, after) we should 
involve which stakeholders in this assessment.  
3. Selection of indicators. We can provide adequate backing for the selection of 
indicators and their mutual relationships, we have considered alternative indicators, 
and in our report we discuss the limitations of the use of these indicators for this 
problem; we know the level of support among scientists and within society 
(including decision makers/politicians) for the use of these indicators.  
4. Appraisal of knowledge base. We have determined the adequacy of the 
knowledge base by establishing: (i) the knowledge and methods which are needed 
to obtain answers of the required quality, (ii) the most important bottlenecks in the 
available knowledge and methods, and (iii) the impact of these bottlenecks on the 
quality of the results. In consultation with the (internal and external) client, we 
have decided what should be done about these bottlenecks.  
5. Mapping and assessment of relevant uncertainties. We have a clear picture of: (i) 
the uncertainties most relevant to the problem, (ii) the effort associated with an 
adequate mapping and assessment of these uncertainties, and (iii) the consequences 
of these uncertainties for the conclusions of this assessment. On the basis of all this 
and in consultation with the (internal and external) client, we have decided how to 
map and assess the relevant uncertainties given the available resources (money, 
time, expertise, etc.).  
6. Reporting of uncertainty information. We have a clear picture of: (i) the context 
of reporting (why, to whom, on behalf of whom, when, where) and (ii) the 
robustness of the main messages. We report in a manner which is clear and tailored 
to the audience: (a) the policy relevant uncertainties and (b) their possible 
consequences for policy making, politics, and society (what are the consequences 
of these uncertainties in terms of potential effects or risks?). In written reporting, 
we see to a balanced and consistent depiction of results in the different parts of the 
report, while providing traceability and adequate backing for the material 
presented.  
From its face, the Mini-Checklist accomplishes two things. First, it provides a paper trail 
showing that assessment authors and researchers have paid attention to the issue of 
uncertainty and communication, protecting them and the agency should another round of 
criticism ensue, such as that in 1999. Second, and more importantly substantively, it raises red 
flag when there are issues of uncertainty, or of communication to stakeholders, that may be 
problematic. In the case of such red flags, it then engages the Quickscan Questionnaire. That 
document consists of six groupings of questions, corresponding to the six items on the mini-
checklist. The question require the assessment team to identify, either through short written 
form (two sentence answers) or through checking multiple choice boxes, features of the 
assessment that have to do with its intended users, alternative framings, and associated 
uncertainties. The Quickscan Hints and Actions List is a 24 page document providing 
guidance to users on how to answer the various questions (Janssen et al., 2003). For further 
guidance, the Detailed Guidance is a 71 page document providing the theoretical foundation 
and background for all of the issues raised in the mini-checklist and quickscan questionnaire 
concerning assessment context and uncertainty communication (van der Sluijs et al., 2003). 
Finally, the Tool Catalogue is a 60-page document describing the analytic methods for 
developing and analyzing uncertainty, including issues such as uncertainty propagation, 
expert elicitation, and scenario analysis (van der Sluijs et al., 2004). 
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Wardekker et al. (2008) evaluated the success of the Dutch guidance system of documents. 
After the guidance was in place, they conducted a number of workshops and surveys with a 
variety of stakeholders, gathering data on what information people wanted and found useful, 
and on their specific reaction to an environmental assessment prepared using the guidance 
documents. Nearly across the board, they found that stakeholders did want uncertainties to be 
described, in quantified terms where possible, consistent with the Dutch system and the 
NUSAP approach. They found substantial difficulties with the interpretation of the IPCC 
uncertainty scale on the one hand, echoing results from Patt and Schrag (2003) and Patt and 
Dessai (2005), and in interpreting the NUSAP kite diagram on the other. They did find that 
stakeholders were interested in information on the sources of uncertainty, and that all such 
detailed information be placed where people would actually read it, rather than buried in an 
appendix. Overall they were positive about the approach taken by the Dutch guidance system. 
5.3 United States SAP 5.2 
The United States Government’s Climate Change Science Program commissioned a set of 21 
reports to guide assessment, communication, and decision-making across the many agencies 
dealing with climate change, such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. These reports took on the name Synthesis and 
Assessment Products, or SAP’s. SAP 5.2 was one of these, and covered the issue of 
uncertainty. After initial drafting it went through extensive review, comment, and revision, 
before its final publication in 2009 (Morgan et al., 2009). 
In many ways, the SAP5.2 is a document that is similar to this one, although of course it was 
written with a much greater budget, a larger author team, with more outside input, and was 
somewhat longer. Like this document, it covered the reasons why uncertainty exists and is 
important in climate change, both the normative and descriptive ways in which uncertainty 
can be dealt with by decision-makers, and many of the issues associated with communicating 
it well, highlighting the need to quantify uncertainties where possible. Unlike this report, the 
SAP5.2 report reviewed some of the statistics commonly used in the climate sciences for 
describing uncertainty, the methods used to estimate uncertainty, such as expert elicitation, 
and modeling tools for the propagation and analysis of uncertainty. The SAP5.2 concluded 
with a short chapter containing “simple guidance” for researchers.  
The guidance chapter in SAP 5.2 consisted of 16 bullet points, divided under two 
subheadings, Reporting uncertainty and Characterizing and analyzing uncertainty.  Under the 
former, the authors made clear that it is essential to not rely only on verbal characterizations 
of uncertainty (since these are subject to very different interpretations), to be clear about 
uncertainties are being reported, to present probability density functions in a manner that is 
clear about the units on the vertical axis, to avoid presenting cumulative probability functions 
alone and without a corresponding density function, to consider using box plots of the kind 
shown in Figure 12 instead of full density functions, and to try to avoid complicating matters 
by presenting second-order uncertainty. 
 
Figure 12: “Tukey” diagram of uncertainty range, recommended by the SAP5.2 as 
an alternative to full probability functions. Source: Morgan et al. (2009). 
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Under the second heading, characterizing and analyzing uncertainty, the bullet points 
covered the value of undertaking expert elicitations in order to develop quantitative 
uncertainty estimates, the need to be careful in reporting (such as through separate 
distributions) when groups of experts disagree substantially, the need to apply care when 
using analytic tools such as Monte Carlo methods, to pay attention to sources of correlation 
between uncertain parameters, and to provide a traceable account as a form of information 
pedigree. The points continued with the suggestion that it often effective to present the 
sensitivity of decisions to uncertainties, rather than simply the uncertainties themselves, and 
on the value of developing scenarios that are clear and transparent with respect to the critical 
variables. The advice concluded with need to examine decisions strategies that are robust to 
uncertainty or ignorance, in cases where meaningful prediction is not possible. 
6 Synthesis 
The three sets of guidance documents—the series of IPCC guidance documents, the suite of 
RIVM/MNP documents, and the SAP5.2 report—represent the state of the art in providing 
guidance on the analysis and communication of uncertainty for climate change decision-
making. Importantly, they are aimed at slightly different audiences. The IPCC guidance is 
aimed specifically at author teams preparing a written assessment report. It is irrelevant for 
these teams to consider issues of public participation, and it is in the mission of the IPCC that 
they are writing for the benefit of governments and negotiators. The Dutch RIVM/MNP 
guidance documents are aimed at analysts and scientists engaged in a wider range of 
environmental assessment activities within the same agency, although there is nothing to stop 
others—outside of the Netherlands—from also using the same guidance. The SAP5.2 report 
is less clear as to its intended audience—the introductory pages state that it is “to inform 
public debate, policy, and operational decisions”—but seems in many ways to be aimed at a 
wide range of scientists and analysts engaged in research and assessment of climate change 
issues.  
Of the three, the RIVM/MNP suite of documents is by far the most developed, in terms of 
providing concrete procedures to guide practitioners. This may reflect the scope of its 
application, namely to a limited and well-defined audience (as with the IPCC), but one 
engaged in a wide range of assessment activities. It may also reflect the quality of thought that 
went into it, building off of the insights of a group of researchers who enjoyed a long and 
close professional relationship. No matter the cause, we find it to be excellent. 
The question for this report, however, is what sort of guidance would be most appropriate in 
the context of the MEDIATION project, potentially as a precursor to the development of the 
adaptation clearing house, an as-yet poorly defined information platform to guide decision-
makers of many kinds throughout Europe on adaptation decision-making. Because the 
application of any guidance we offer here is so unclear, the chances that whatever we suggest 
here will eventually be forgotten and ignored are higher. To try to make our guidance most 
memorable, then, we keep it as simple as possible. This simplicity, then, may be the main 
added value we bring above and beyond the other guidance documents we have described, 
while preserving their core lessons 
In the spirit of that simplicity, we frame the insights from the previous guidance documents in 
terms of three simple themes: parsimony, personalization, and practicality. Figure 13 
illustrates this concept. In the following subsections we explain what we mean. 
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Figure 13: Three pillars of climate adaptation decision-support. Sound decision-
making rests on top of a base of scientific knowledge and insight, but forming the 
link between the two is decision support. That decision support has to incorporate 
three features, each represented by a different column. The Doric column 
represents parsimony, and the need to avoid overwhelming decision-makers with 
information. The human face represents personalization, and the fact that every 
element of uncertainty traces to human judgment and belief. The emergency car 
jack represents practicality, and the need to respect decision-makers limited time, 
attention, and resources. 
6.1 Parsimony: less is more, but more is not less 
A critical insight from the psychological literature that we have cited is that when people are 
presented with too much information for them to analyze, understand, and easily digest, they 
will ignore all of it. A critical insight from the political science literature that we have cited is 
that when scientists frame information as highly uncertain, they will often choose to take no 
action on its basis, also effectively ignoring all of the information. A clear ramification of this 
is that to get information to be used at all, it must remain simple, and must frame that 
information in terms of what scientists do know, and not in terms of where their knowledge 
falls short of predicting events with certainty, or according to a well-defined probability 
distribution.  
To apply this advice, it is useful to consider with the range of precision identified in the 
guidance paper for the AR4 (IPCC, 2005):  
• A direction of change is ambiguous or unpredictable. 
• A direction of change or trend can be identified. 
• An order of magnitude for a change can be identified 
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• A range or confidence interval can be given, based on objective analysis or 
expert judgment. 
• A probability of occurrence of a given event can be identified. 
• A probability distribution can be identified for changes in a continuous 
variable. 
The initial task is to identify the level of precision that is possible, and craft each statement to 
expresses the state of knowledge according to that level, rather than try to frame all 
statements around a common level. Hence, if the precision that is possible is a range or 
confidence interval (the fourth bullet point), the first statement that the decision-makers 
should encounter could be something like: “Scientists believe sea level rise for this location 
will be between X and Y centimeters.” This would be far preferable to a statement such as: “It 
is impossible to determine the precise amount of sea level rise for this location, or even the 
precise probabilities for different ranges of sea level rise, and so it is only possible to identify 
an outer range of between X and Y centimeters.” The first statement is more parsimonious. 
Many decision-makers will need only this first piece of information. Others will need and 
want more, such as how likely it is that scientific research will be able to provide more 
precise information in the future. An analogy is the reading of a newspaper article. 
Newspaper articles are structured with the core message in the headline and first paragraph, 
which is the only text most people actually read. The remainder of the story, perhaps the 
following ten or twenty paragraphs, provide additional detail, and background information, 
that is useful and interesting for a small fraction of the readers. In the same way, good 
decision-support needs to begin with the simple message, but then create an opportunity for 
decision-makers to learn more. How to do this depends on the medium of communication. 
Written reports accomplish this when they follow the journalistic style. On-line resources can 
accomplish this through progressive disclosure of information. Participatory processes can 
accomplish this through question and answer periods, or by dividing participants into break-
out groups to focus on the problems most important to each person. 
6.2 Personalization: every uncertainty has a human story behind it 
In our scientific training, many of us learned to write scientific papers in a depersonalized 
style, using the passive voice, and not referring to the researchers themselves. Thus, we wrote 
sentences like: “Interviews of the stakeholders were carried out between X and Y.” Today, 
the accepted style of writing has changed, and we now would write the same statement as “I 
(or we, in a jointly authored paper) interviewed stakeholders between X and Y.” Causing the 
change has been the recognition that scientific research is indeed a personal and subjective 
process, and that the communication of scientists’ results is more accurate and more credible 
when they recognize, in their writing, their own role in the process. 
This lesson is even more important when scientists communicate with non-scientists, as they 
do in the process of decision-support. A great deal of research on communication and 
memory suggests that people recall, and act on, information that is laden with emotion, and 
that emotions themselves are most clearly tied to stories and events involving people. Where 
it is possible to tell a human story behind any piece of scientific information, do so, as it will 
make it easier for decision-makers to keep that information in their head. This is especially 
important when it comes to making decisions under conditions of uncertainty, because this 
requires people to work with several pieces of information, many of them difficult to 
understand, at the same time. 
How can this function in practice, when much of the scientific information results from 
computer models? The answer is to describe, wherever possible, the work that people did 
gathering the data and developing the theory for those models, and the choices that the 
modelers faced in putting those data and theories into computer code. Providing as much 
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personal detail as possible, such as the country or university where the researchers were 
working, increases the chances that the decision-makers will keep the results of that research 
in their heads. Providing personal detail also increases the chances that they will forgive less 
than complete scientific understanding.  
A challenge in presenting such detail is also to respect the need for parsimony. It can be an 
inherent tradeoff, for which there is not good firm rule. One can surmise that experience in 
conducting assessment, as well as knowledge of the users and what details they will find most 
relevant, leads to improved judgment in terms of what personal details are most important. 
6.3 Practicality: every decision-maker leads a busy life 
Scientists often spend years analyzing a particular problem. When they advise decision-
makers, they often want the information used most productively, namely in a manner that 
leads to the best possible results, the optimum decision. Sometimes decision-makers want this 
too, and in these cases it is extremely helpful to be offered a decision-making framework 
within which to apply the information most effectively. But often they do not. Often they just 
want to make sure that any given decision doesn’t go horribly wrong, and thus to know that 
the new information that scientists are providing them doesn’t change this. It is like getting a 
flat tire while driving to an important appointment. You want to open the trunk and find a 
usable jack, wrench, and spare tire, to get you on your way quickly again. You don’t want to 
take this as a good opportunity to inspect the brake pads and grease the lug nuts. 
Put into practice in the context of decision-support, it means that we need to be willing to 
accept decision-making frameworks as they are, even if they are not well adapted the 
particular kinds of uncertainty that our information contains. That the status quo way of 
making decisions does not fit the new problem may especially be the case when uncertainties 
are high, because often the established ways of making decisions function well on the 
assumption of being able to predict outcomes well. Those decision-making frameworks are 
often in place for historical reasons that make good sense, and yet about which we as 
scientists know little or nothing. Given that ignorance, our job is not to explain to decision-
makers why they need to adopt a different decision-making framework. Rather, our job is to 
provide information that fits the framework that they are using. If their decision-making 
framework assumes perfect foresight, as will often be the case, then we need to help them to 
apply that framework multiple times to cover the range of possible or likely futures, so that 
they can understand the different options that they may decide upon.  
At the same time, however, there are cases where decision-makers do have the time to apply 
our information as effectively as possible, and are willing to consider alternative way of 
framing a problem, valuing outcomes, or selecting choices. For these cases, effective 
decision-support ideally involves working with them to identify the decision-making 
framework that is well suited not just to this immediate problem, but also to the broader class 
of problems that decision-makers may apply it in the future, having applied it here. Where 
this is not possible, such as in the case of a written report or online tool, then we can provide 
decision-makers with the option of learning about appropriate decision-making frameworks 
for their particular choice problem. It is essential, however, to make this information non-
compulsory reading, in the spirit of progressive disclosure. 
The challenge that this creates is for us to know our audience. This in turn highlights the 
importance of good boundary organizations on the one hand, and participatory processes on 
the other. If scientists are to do a good job at research, they simply may not have the time to 
understand the ways in which their research results can and should be applied. That often 
needs to be a task for others, and in many ways it is a task no less important and no less 
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